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Abstract 
 
 
The aim of this thesis is to examine the relationship of all corporate governance 
indicators with firm performance (proxied by price to book value) and tax fees. Using a 
sample of 133 large U.S firms, in a single model, we explore the correlation of price to 
book value with board of director’s structure (composition and size). Our results show 
that smaller and younger boards with less independent directors lead to a higher firm 
performance. We further find that presence of women on board is important rather than 
their number. The outcome of the study shows also that financial expertise of audit 
committee members has a significant and positive influence on the amount of tax fees. 
Overall, the results suggest that board characteristics are important and they influence 
firm performance.  
 
Keywords: board of directors, firm performance, price to book value, governance 
indicators, tax fees. 
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Chapter 1  
 
Introduction 
Corporate governance and particularly the role of board of directors, represents an 
important topic of many academic researches. But it had probably never been as 
important to understand the fundamental role of the board, as it was during the financial 
crisis. One of the key factors contributing to the crisis is related to the weaknesses in 
corporate governance system and particularly to the ineffectiveness of the corporate 
boards. Not being aware of the risk facing their firms, many boards of directors failed to 
deal with it. (Kirkpatrick, 2009) in a report about corporate governance lessons from the 
crisis states as follows:  
 
 “Boards had to be clear about the strategy and risk appetite of the company and to 
respond in a timely manner, requiring efficient reporting systems”                         
 
From this point of view, it is of special interest to explore the characteristics of boards, in 
order to find the ways of improving their effectiveness. In this study we aim to find the 
optimal structure of the board of directors that leads to a higher firm performance, and 
consequently to build a model of strong corporate governance characterized by 
transparency, integrity, high quality of financial reporting and less agency problems.  
An impressive set of prior researches have explored the impact of corporate governance 
structure on firm profitability or firm performance. The governance structure is broadly 
represented by board size and its composition. In addition, the overall board composition 
includes board independence, insider ownership, gender diversity and average age of 
members in the board. Various empirical researches focus on the association between 
board size and firm performance. (Yermack, 1996) recommends the limiting of board 
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size as a way of improving the market valuation of the firm. The author finds an inverse 
and significant relationship between board size and firm value using a sample of major 
U.S corporations. These results are consistent with the findings of (Hermalin and 
Weisbach, 1988), who conduct an analysis on a large sample of NYSE-traded companies.  
On the other hand, an extensive empirical literature evaluates the linkage between board 
composition and firm performance. (Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1990) report that the 
appointment of independent directors on board increases firm value. Additionally, 
(Adams and Ferreira, 2009) suggest that female directors influence significantly the firm 
outcomes and (Wiersema and Bantel, 1992) report that boards characterized by a lower 
average age of its members, have better performance.           
This study is a contribution to the ongoing debate on the examination of the relationship 
between governance indicators and firm performance. Previous studies in this research 
stream have focused in one indicator of corporate governance, overlooking the others. 
The present paper will add to the literature by including all governance indicators (board 
activity, size, independence, gender diversity etc) in a single model. We attempt to 
provide a complete and accurate model of good corporate governance capturing all 
characteristics that influence board effectiveness and its performance. In addition, while 
several previous studies utilize market measures of firm performance such as Tobin’s Q 
(Yermack, Adams and Mehran, Bgahat and Black, Morck, Shleifer and Vishny) and price 
to book ratio (Vafeas), in the present study we will try to combine two different 
measures, the market and the accounting performance measure. Our results appear to be 
sensitive to the choice of the proxy of firm performance.  
Applying the fixed effect specification in a sample of 133 major US firms over the period 
2005 to 2009, the findings of this study appear to be quite promising. We report a 
negative association between firm performance and board size, board independence and 
average age of directors on board; and a positive and significant relation between firm 
performance and insider ownership. On the other hand, no significant association is found 
for gender diversity and board activity (represented by the number of meetings held 
during the fiscal year). Of a special interest is also the significance of the control 
variables. Firm size and leverage appear to be significant and positively related to firm 
performance. 
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Besides the investigation on the relationship between corporate governance and firm 
performance, an important part of the study will be dedicated to the testing of the link 
between governance indicators and tax fees. Previous authors have provided few 
researches that discuss the association between corporate governance variables and the 
amount of tax fees. In the present study will examine the direct interaction of tax fees 
with corporate governance variables paying special attention to the Audit Committee 
characteristics (audit committee meetings, size and number of financial experts on the 
committee). Our results suggest that the amount of tax fees paid to auditors is positively 
correlated to the number of financial experts in the committee and negatively correlated 
with committee meetings. Meanwhile, audit committee size does not influence 
significantly the tax fees. 
A separate chapter of the paper is dedicated to the development of alternative models that 
relate corporate governance variables with firm performance. We first investigate the 
influence of female directors on firm value by introducing gender as a dummy variable. 
We obtain some remarkable results; the presence of women is found to be significant and 
positively related to firm performance. Hence, having at least one woman in the board 
improves the firm performance. However, the appointment of another woman in board is 
not followed with any increase in firm value. 
Of a special interest is the usage of an accounting performance measure as a dependent 
variable when exploring the interaction between firm performance and governance 
indicators. Introducing ROA as a proxy of firm performance in a new model, we find that 
the regression estimates change substantially. The number of board meetings is proved 
significant and positively associated with firm performance. Nevertheless, all other 
corporate governance variables are no longer significant. 
Importantly, we follow the method of (Vafeas, 1999) by estimating the regression using 
the means of the variable and giving to the data a cross sectional interpretation. 
Consistent with expectations, board size and age are proven to be significant and 
negatively related with firm performance. On the other hand, board independence is 
significant and positively associated with firm value. Other governance variables are 
proven to be insignificant.  
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In the last alternative model, we present evidence by estimating the relationship corporate 
governance-firm performance on the other way around. Consistent with the findings of 
(Hermalin and Weisbach, 1988), firms appoint additional independent directors on board 
in response to past poor performance. However, the board size remains unchanged 
because of other director’s departure. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organized in the following way. Chapter 2 provides an 
overview of corporate governance framework by comparing the Anglo-Saxon 
governance model with the Continental one and gives insights on the role of corporate 
boards. Chapter 3 discusses prior empirical researches on corporate governance 
indicators, firm performance and tax management. Based on the discussion of previous 
literature, Chapter 4 introduces a set of hypotheses to be tested. Chapter 5 is about 
methodology and description of variables. Chapter 6 reports descriptive statistics and 
results of the econometric models. In Chapter 7 we develop some alternative models on 
corporate governance indicators and firm performance. Chapter 8 summaries the results 
obtained from the present study and concludes by addressing some limitations. 
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Chapter 2  
 
Basic framework of Corporate Governance 
  
There is a huge and expanding literature in the area of corporate governance. In 
the ongoing studies about this topic, different authors have given different definitions 
about it. According to (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) definition “Corporate governance 
deals with the ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of 
getting a return on their investment”. They study corporate governance taking as a 
viewpoint the agency theory, which is usually referred to the division of ownership and 
control. (Wolfensohn, 1999) provides a more broaden definition. He states that 
“Corporate governance is about promoting corporate fairness, transparency and 
accountability”. In addition to this, (Charkman, 1994) also recognizes accountability to 
be essential and necessary for the stakeholders. In this framework, the author identifies 
two main principles of corporate governance applied in most cases: 
 
 That management must be able to drive the enterprise forward free from undue 
constraint caused by government interference, fear of litigation, or fear of 
displacement. 
 
 That this freedom – to use managerial power or patronage – must be exercised 
with a framework of effective accountability. Nominal accountability is not 
enough. Accountability implies transparency (page 363).  
 
Nevertheless, at the macro level corporate governance, the principal-agent perspective, as 
introduced by (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) above, is distinguished broadly in the 
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governance debate. Moreover, most approaches toward corporate governance point out 
the separation of ownership and control which often is the source of problems between 
managers and shareholders. This can be demonstrated by what Adam Smith’s early notes, 
published on his book “Wealth of Nations”: 
 
“The directors of such companies, however, being the managers rather of other people's 
money than of their own, it cannot well be expected, that they should watch over it with 
the same anxious vigilance with which the partners in a private co-partnery frequently 
watch over their own. Negligence and profusion, therefore, must always prevail, more or 
less in the management of the affairs of such a company” (p.700) 
 
However, these potential problems, known as conflicts of interest between shareholders 
(who provide the capital) and managers (who use the capital) depend on the ownership 
structure of the company and on the allocation of power within it. The primary condition 
that guarantees good corporate governance is the proper separation of authorities and 
responsibilities among the company’s management, its shareholders and other 
stakeholders ( such as employees). A clear identification of roles is crucial because it 
helps ensuring transparency, accountability and integrity in management structures. 
However, at this point, it is essential to distinguish different approaches of companies to 
corporate governance. (Xu and Wang, 1997) make a difference between “control-
oriented” models and "arm's-length" financing models. According to the authors, in 
“control-oriented" financing model the ownership is concentrated in the hand of the 
major investors. Also the management is under the control of these investors. 
On the other hand, in the “arm’s-length” financing model, the ownership is broadly 
among shareholders, who do not have a major influence on management. However, 
managers are strongly motivated to improve the corporate performance because 
otherwise they will be sanctioned by hostile takeovers. 
(Walsh and Seward, 1990) bring on focus the importance of aligning these conflicts of 
interest between shareholders and managers through management control. 
Figure 1 below, illustrates the relationship between the two groups of management 
control: the internal mechanisms and the external ones. The internal control cycle reflects 
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the monitoring and controlling activity of board of directors, meanwhile the external 
control cycle refers to the company control by the market. External and internal 
entrenchment practices present all frictions that prevent the efficient operation of these 
mechanisms, such as practices adopted by managers in order to ensure themselves from 
being dismissed. 
It can be observed that the firm performance depends on the efficiency of internal control 
mechanisms associated or not with internal entrenchment practices. Nevertheless, 
because a well entrenched management can bring the failure of the firm, it is crucial to 
adopt various internal controls combined with corporate reconstructing in order to 
improve the firm performance. 
 
Figure 1: The relationship between internal and external corporate control mechanisms 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Walsh and Seward, 1990 
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Coming now to the models of corporate governance, (Ooghe and De Vuyst, 2001) 
compare the Anglo-Saxon model (known as shareholders model of corporate governance) 
being a characteristic model of Anglo-Saxon countries and the Continental European 
model (known as stakeholders model of corporate governance) as typical model of 
Continental Europe countries. These models appear to be very different observed from 
the business perspective; implying that in different countries, ownership and control of 
companies are organized in different ways.  According to (Ooghe and De Vuyst, 2001) 
one of the main distinctions between two models is the low level of ownership 
concentration in Anglo-Saxon countries comparing with the one in Continental Europe 
countries. This implies that Anglo-Saxon countries shareholder groups hold low 
proportions of the publicly traded shares. The reasons behind this rely on the fact that 
companies of Anglo-Saxon countries are larger in terms of capital compared with 
companies of Continental Europe countries. Furthermore, companies of Anglo-Saxon 
countries are broadly listed in stock exchanges, and this allows shareholders to spread 
their ownership over more companies but in the meantime leads to less personal 
relationship between companies and their shareholders. On the other hand, only few 
companies in Continental Europe countries are publicly traded which allows strong 
personal rapport between company’s managers and shareholders. 
Beside the shareholder concentration, the paper of (Ooghe and De Vuyst, 2001) provides 
another difference between the two main governance models: the shareholders identity. 
According to the authors, in the Anglo-Saxon countries, because of regulations, 
companies are obliged to use agents of financial institutions to manage their trading.  The 
contrary appears to be in Continental Europe countries as the companies operate directly, 
without using agents.  For example, in United States, taken as example from Anglo-
Saxon countries, most of shares are kept by agents of financial institutions rather than 
private individuals but the opposite pattern is shown in Germany and Italy, as examples 
from Continental Europe countries, where most of the shares are kept by private 
individuals. Moreover, the mutual shareholding appears to cause other differences 
between the models. As a consequence, the ownership structure appears to be more 
transparent in Anglo-Saxon countries rather than in the Continental ones. 
 
 9 
2.1 The board of directors  
 
Board of directors represents an important mechanism of the corporate governance 
system and it is considered to be a traditional solution to the agency problem. Besides, 
legal requirements for incorporation ask for the set up of the board of directors (Hermalin 
and Weisbach, 2003). In Anglo-Saxon countries, the principal role of the board is to 
make sure that shareholders have accurate and transparent information about firm 
profitability, risks and future objectives. Additionally, the board ensures that the 
management actions are taken to maximize shareholder’s wealth. However, the question 
of what determines the board effectiveness in carrying out its roles and responsibilities 
remains in the centre of many research agendas. Prior studies find out that board 
characteristics represent an essential element influencing they way the board realizes its 
functions and makes its decisions. When assessing board characteristics, special interest 
is given to its composition and size. The corporate governance literature points out that 
the composition of the board of directors represents an important component in protecting 
the interests of shareholders, particularly in cases when there is a divergence of interests 
between managers and shareholders. Various empirical researches report as proxies for 
board composition the number of independent directors, gender diversity and average age 
of directors on board. The boards of most major U.S corporations are composed of 
different types of directors. First, the board consists of inside or executive directors who 
have full-time executive responsibilities; typically in the role of the insider is the CEO. 
Second, the board has independent or outside directors that have no material or 
contractual relationship with the company and do not have executive responsibilities.  
The level of presentation of independent directors on board is higher than the one of 
inside directors. Typically, the Corporate Governance guidelines of each company 
require that a majority of directors should meet the criteria of independence. Companies 
appoint independent directors in their boards because this category of directors is thought 
to facilitate the process of monitoring, controlling and financial reporting ( Peasnell, Pope 
and Young, 1998). Moreover, a higher proportion of independent directors on board can 
improve firm performance (Hsu and Wu, 2009) 
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Beside the insider and outsiders, gray directors represent a third category of directors who 
are not full time employees. Typically, they are called as non-executive and non 
independent directors. 
Another element that represents board composition is gender diversity. Many companies 
are dominated by the presence of men; however, in recent years the number of female 
directors serving on firm’s boards has increased significantly. It appears that the presence 
of women has an important influence on board governance. (Adams and Ferreira, 2009) 
find evidence that gender diverse boards improve the monitoring process and firm 
performance.  
The board of directors makes up a diverse unit also in terms of age. In accordance to the 
directors retirement policy of each company, directors must retire when they attain age 72 
or 74, depending on the company. The director’s age is found to be negatively associated 
to changes in corporate strategy (Wiersema and Bantel, 1992). A potential explanation of 
this is that young directors have more confidence in their decision and are more disposed 
to undertake risks and major changes in their companies. In addition, young directors are 
considered to creative and innovative in decision making process.    
Besides the board composition, the literature points out the crucial impact of board size. 
Even if companies consider that the quality of members is more important than their 
number, typically a board size of 6 to 9 directors ensures flexibility and better 
functioning. 
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Chapter 3  
 
Literature Review 
A plethora of diverse researches have explored the association between corporate 
governance measures and firm performance. Different studies have identified as a priority 
different aspects of corporate governance such as board size, outside directors or the 
percentage of stock ownership. In addition, only few papers have examined the impact of 
corporate governance in tax management and for this reason we will try to bring some 
evidence whether there any relationship between these two indicators. 
 
Below we provide brief summaries of the main papers within the literature concentrating 
on both theoretical and empirical findings. We will be focused in different approaches 
toward the important influence of corporate governance measures on firm performance 
and tax fees. The literature reviews that will be explored in this section represent the key 
studies that link several corporate governance variables with firm performance and tax 
management. Below we provide a brief introduction of the principal literature and their 
central issue. This is followed by a more complete analyze in the continuation of the 
paper. For example (Yermack 1996) examined whether the board size determines firm 
performance and found a higher market value for firms with small boards. The same 
study is undertaken also by (Jensen, 1993), who reports the same inverse relationship 
between board size and firm performance. On the other hand, in a prior empirical 
research, (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1988) examined the influence of firm performance on 
board composition, highlighting the importance of outside directors. Furthermore, 
(Vafeas, 1999) presented the measurement of the influence of board activity (board 
meeting frequency) on firm performance.  
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According to the association of tax management and governance indicators, the principal 
study that we will follow is the one of (Noga and Minnick, 2010) that provides insights 
on the impact of governance characteristics on tax management. 
 
3.1 Board size impact on firm performance 
 
Prior empirical studies have widely investigated the structure and efficiency of corporate 
governance systems. Much of the research spotlight the crucial role of board of directors, 
considering it as a mechanism that enhances corporate and economic performance. 
According to (Jensen, 1993), the board of directors can be considered as an effective 
control mechanism that can provide advance caution to the company before problems 
reach the crisis phase. One of the main findings of the paper is related with the size of the 
board of directors. Companies that limit the number of members in the board are more 
likely to have a better performance; meanwhile oversized boards tend to become less 
effective. In consensus with this conclusion, the author states that: 
 
“When boards get beyond seven or eight people they are less likely to function effectively 
and are easier for the CEO to control”. 
  
The above conclusion which highlights the significance of board size is supported by the 
empirical research of (Yermack 1996), who presents the same result on his paper. 
According to the author, having small boards enhances company’s performance and 
influences positively the investor’s behavior. Moreover, the study’s empirical findings 
show that there is a negative association between board size and company value. 
Additionally, large board of directors are characterized by poor communication among 
the member and moreover the decision making process in less effective comparing with 
the firms that have smaller boards. In order to analyze the impact of small boards on 
market valuation of companies, the author undertakes a cross-sectional analysis by using 
a sample of 452 leading U.S public corporations over the period 1984 to 1991, published 
in Forbes Magazine. In order to estimate the relationship, the least squares regression is 
run by taking Tobin’s Q (representing market value of total assets over replacement costs 
of assets) as a dependent variable and board size (represented by the number of directors 
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set on each company’s board) as independent variable. The findings of the paper 
demonstrate that the association between board size and firm performance appears to be 
quite significant as it shows that the larger the board size the lower the profitability. 
Moreover, the effectiveness of small boards is reflected also in financial ratios because 
the higher the profitability of companies with small boards, the higher is the efficiency of 
asset utilization. 
In addition, the board size influences the CEO compensation incentives as the 
compensation programs represent an important responsibility of the board of directors. 
The author finds that CEO receives higher compensation incentives in firms with smaller 
boards. The analyzes is followed by estimating how the change in board size impact the 
market value of a company as this change spreads possible reactions among investors. 
The results obtained verify that investors approve a decrease in board size, and they react 
negatively in case of board expansions. Moreover, changes in boards of directors are 
influenced by the company’s performance. For example, companies that perform poorly 
are characterized by more changes in the board of directors, by more departures and more 
appointments than other good performing companies. However, the research does not 
support the evidence that companies adjust the board of director’s size as a result of the 
past performance. 
 
Figure 2 below shows the Tobin’s Q value for different board sizes using sample means 
and medians. In this case Tobin’s Q is used a proxy for the firm value.  
It can be observed that Tobin’s Q value decreases, as the size of board increases. For 
example, a board with 6 directors has a mean Tobin’s Q of 1.65; meanwhile a board of 12 
directors has a mean Tobin’s Q of 1. This indicates a significant decrease in firm value as 
the size of the board doubles. The optimal board size ranges between 5 to 7 members as it 
corresponds to the highest value of Tobin’s Q. 
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Figure 2: Board size and Tobin’s Q: Sample Means and medians. 
 
 
Source: Yermack, 1996 
 
 
Converse results are reported by (Adams and Mehran, 2008). The authors conduct a 
survey using a sample of 480 banking firms over the period 1986 to 1999. The difference 
between this study and prior ones is in the investigation of the relationship between board 
size and performance for the banking industry. Motivated by the subprime mortgage 
crisis, they try to find the impact of board size and composition on bank performance. By 
using a large range of data regarding the bank governance, the study identifies as 
financial performance variables Tobin’s Q and ROA and as corporate governance 
variables the board size, board composition (inside and outside directors) and other 
governance variables.  
The empirical results report a positive relationship between board size and Tobin’s Q. 
The authors provide two possible explanations why their findings are not consistent with 
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previous literature. First, the increase in board size is attributed to an increase in merger 
and acquisition activity and secondly such result can be attributed to the presence of 
endogeneity due to the exclusion of organizational structure variables. Moreover, the 
paper reports a strong association between performance and the size of the board meeting 
fee and it states that the relationship between performance and the number of committees 
is negative. 
 
3.2 Board of director’s activity impact on firm performance 
 
On the other hand (Kaplan and Reishus, 1990), investigate the interplay between the firm 
performance and top executives’ activity on other boards of directors. Instead of Tobin’s 
Q or other profitability ratios, the analysis uses the dividends cuts as a measure of firm 
performance. The findings provide evidence on the significant correlation between the 
firm performance and the outside directorship activity. This is consistent with the 
evidence that low performance firms that reduce their dividends are more likely to be 
managed by directors that are not involved as outside directors. The testing results 
demonstrate that it is six times more likely for managers of poor performing firms to 
loose their seats in the board of directors in comparison with the managers of good 
performing firms. Furthermore, the good performance firm’s managers are two times 
likely to obtain outside activity than those of poor performing firms. The empirical 
investigation suggests that managers that serve in outside boards are perceived to be 
better monitors, which leads to an improvement of their reputation and also influences the 
firm’s performance. 
 
(Vafeas, 1999) presents another empirical research of great interest. He explores the 
relationship of another corporate governance measure with firm performance. More 
specifically, in the center of his study is the measurement of the influence of board 
activity on firm performance. In this case, as a proxy for measuring the intensity of board 
activity is used the board meeting frequency which refers to the number of meetings of 
board of directors each fiscal year. Meanwhile, the price to book ratio is used as a proxy 
of firm performance. The study is undertaken by using a sample of 307 companies 
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published in Forbes magazine over the period 1990 – 1994.  The relationship between the 
variables is measured by using OLS regression equations and Two – Stages Least squares 
estimation method.  
The results reveal that firms with lowest number of board meetings exhibit the highest 
price to book value. This implies a negative relationship between the board meeting 
frequency and firm performance. An explanation of this can be that the decisions of 
boards that meet more frequently need more time to be taken. Moreover, in such cases 
the communication and the contact between the directors are less efficient than in boards 
that meet more rarely. Further testing of the study shows that there is a positive 
relationship between the frequency of board meetings and board size. This implies that 
large boards of directors meet more often. As a result, more frequent board meetings 
means larger board size which leads to a negative relation of board size with firm 
performance.  This conclusion is consistent with the study of (Yermack, 1996), who 
suggests higher firm value for small board sizes. The empirical testing indicates also that 
companies, whose boards of directors meet very frequently, are less valued in the market 
and this leads to a decline in the level of share prices. On the other hand, the decline in 
share prices is followed by an increase in the board meeting frequency. 
Additional findings of the study suggest that the operating performance gets better after 
years of abnormal board activity. These enhancement in performance are characteristic of 
firms with poor past performance. The board activity measured by frequency of board 
meetings is negatively related with the stock ownership but positively associated with the 
number of committees inside the firm. 
 
3.3 Board composition impact on firm performance 
 
Board composition has taken great interest because it influences the way board functions. 
Typically, it refers to the type of directors that represent the board such as independent 
directors and inside directors. Many prior studies have explored the associated between 
board independence and firm performance. Nevertheless, they have not established a 
clear correlation between these two variables. (Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1990) report that 
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the appointment of an additional independent director on boards composed mostly of 
independent directors results in an increase in firm value. This finding supports the idea 
that independent directors are chosen in accordance with the interest of shareholders. 
(Bhagat and Black, 2001) conduct a research using a sample of 934 large U.S companies 
over the period 1985 to 1995. The authors examine the relationship between board 
independence, measured by the fraction of independent directors on board, with long 
term performance measured by ROA and Tobin’s Q. The main result of the study is that 
firms react in situations of low profitability by increasing the number of independent 
directors on board. Additionally, the role of independent directors is important but it is 
more likely that increasing their number does not lead to an improvement in firm 
performance. Two reasons that support this argument are: first, involving inside directors 
in the board can add value and secondly, independent directors should be given a part of 
the stock ownership in order to motivate them to be more effective.  
However, no strong evidence is found that firms with a higher proportion of independent 
directors have a higher profitability and performance. 
(Peng, 2004) addresses the same issue on the influence of a greater representation of 
independent directors in the board, on firm performance. The author investigates whether 
the appointment of independent directors in a given year is affected by the prior poor 
performance of the firm and prior firm size. The research is conducted using a sample of 
530 Chinese firms quoted on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchange during the 
period 1992-1996. The findings suggest two conclusions based on the proxy of firm 
performance used as a dependent variable; ROE and sales growth. When ROE is included 
in the regression, board independence has no significant impact on firm performance. But 
when using sales growth as dependent variables, board independence has a significant 
positive influence on firm performance. On the other hand, the findings show strong 
support about a significant positive relationship between number of independent directors 
and prior firm performance and size. Nevertheless, the effect appears to be stronger for 
the period 1992-1994 and than decreases sharply during 1995-1996.  
(Hayes, Mehran and Schaefer,
 
2005) analyze cross-sectional variations on the boards of 
directors’ committee structure over the period 1997 – 1998 for S&P 500 companies. 
According to the findings of the paper, there is a positive relationship between number of 
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committees and company size. Moreover, the more outside directors the board of 
directors has, the higher is the number of committees. This result implies also a higher 
frequency of committee meetings as the boards becomes larger and the functions that 
committees should fulfill increase. Another interesting result of the study is related with 
dividend paying companies that appear to have more committee functions.  Meanwhile, 
in companies where the percentage of CEO ownership is higher, the committee performs 
fewer tasks. This conclusion implies that because of the ownership being concentrated in 
the CEO level, the number of tasks to be forwarded and be performed by the committees 
does not increase. Furthermore, when involving the firm performance as a variable 
represented by price to book value, the authors find a positive relationship with the 
portion of stocks held by the CEOs but a negative association with the fraction of stocks 
held by outside directors serving in other committees.  
Additionally, other empirical researches have found no significant linkage between board 
of director’s composition and firm performance. More specifically, (Klein, 1998) brings 
evidence on the relationship between board committee structures and firm profitability.  
The analysis suggests that the percentage of inside directors as part of the whole board 
does not influence the firm performance. Nevertheless, positive association is found 
among the number of inside directors on finance committee and the accounting 
performance indicator.  In continuance to this result, the main outcome of the research is 
that inside directors can be more valuable and effective if the companies use them in a 
proper way.  
 (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1988) undertake an analysis on the opposite direction. They 
examine the influence of firm performance on board composition. The study is 
undertaken by gathering data on the board of directors and earnings for a sample of about 
300 companies traded in NYSE. The main findings of the paper are obtained by 
estimating separate equations for each of the arrivals and departures from the board of 
directors. The empirical results suggest that after a poor performance of the company, in 
most cases it happens that the outside directors join the board of directors and inside 
directors leave it. There are two reasons for this result. First, firms tend to fire the inside 
directors that might have caused the poor performance. As a result, the vacancy position 
created because of inside director’s departure is filled by the taking the outside directors 
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in the board. The second reason is related with the principal – agent theory. (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983), suggest that management payoffs should be linked to their performance. 
This implies that in case a firm performs poorly it gives signals of poor management; 
therefore this indicates that the firm needs to improve its management and monitoring. 
Outside directors are the ones that are added to the board of directors with the purpose of 
monitoring the insiders.   
An important insight is also given by (Abidin and Kamal, 2009) who presents the 
association of board structure and firm performance in Malaysia. The study can be 
distinguished because it demonstrates the importance of intellectual capital as an 
important resource which greatly determines the company’s performance. On this 
context, the author measures the firm performance as “the value added (VA) efficiency of 
the firm’s physical and intellectual resources” in comparison with other prior research 
that use Tobin’s Q or other profitability ratios. The VA efficiency is computed by 
employing the Value Added Intellectual Coefficient (VAIC). Consistent with previous 
literature, the empirical testing defines a positive association between the board 
characteristics (measured by the proportion of independent non-executive directors) and 
the VA efficiency. This implies that the board characteristics have a positive influence on 
firm value according to the VAIC measurement. However, a less significant association 
is found between board size and firm performance. 
 
3.4 Insider ownership and firm performance 
 
(Hayes, Mehran and Schaefer, 2005) explore the interaction between the percentage of 
shares held by the directors and firm performance. Using a sample of S&P 500 firms for 
the period 1997 and 1998, the authors report a significant negative relationship between 
the percentage of shares held by independent directors and firm performance, but a 
significant positive association between the fractions of shares held by CEOs and firm 
performance, as measured by price to book value. 
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3.5 Gender diversity in the boardroom and its impact on firm 
performance  
 
In their survey, (Campbell and Minguez-Vera, 2007) consider another element of 
corporate governance, specifically the gender composition of the board of directors. The 
authors identify whether there is a relationship between the fraction of women in the 
board and Tobin’s Q value, by bringing evidence on the influence of women presence on 
the board on firm value. Empirical testing on Spanish board of directors, identify that the 
percentage of women on the board of directors has a significant, positive impact on 
Tobin’s Q value. (Adams and Ferreira, 2009) obtained similar results when analyzing the 
influence of female directors on firm outcomes on 1939 firms included in S& P 500, S&P 
MidCap, and S&P SmallCap. Accordingly, the authors draw attention to the importance 
of gender diversity in the boardroom. Consistent with the idea that women in board of 
directors have a substantial influence on board composition; they show that the gender 
composition of boards influences positively the efficiency and effectiveness of the board 
and generally it leads to a better performance for firms that suffer from a weak corporate 
governance. Moreover, the authors find evidence that the presence of women in the board 
of directors improves the attendance records and their behavior influences positively the 
monitoring process.  
In the same line, are the conclusions given by (Carter, Simkins and Simpson, 2003) who 
determine a significant and positive association between the percentage of women on the 
board of directors and firm value for a sample of 1000 firms taken from "Fortune" 
magazine.  
Further evidence that support this line of reasoning is given by (Shrader, Blackburn and 
Iles, 1997). In their empirical research, the authors conduct an investigation on 200 firms 
published by the Wall Street Journal for year 1992.  For the firms taken in consideration, 
about 25 % of top management positions were held by women. The analysis brings 
evidence on how an increase in the percentage of women in board of directors improves 
the financial performance outcomes of a company. According to the findings, the firms 
should perform well if they employ a higher number of women in the position of 
“manager”. This is due to the fact that women are perceived to be strong on bringing new 
 21 
contributions, ideas and innovations in the company. Moreover, the atmosphere and 
organizational learning improves as more women are seated in the boards of directors. On 
the other hand, the relationship between the women proportion in the management team 
and firm performance is more significant in cases when women are assigned duties that 
have great impact on the firm.  
Motivated by the fact that women have been holding an increasing number of board seats 
in U.S companies, (Dobbin and Jung, 2010) analyze whether the presence of female 
directors in the board affects company’s profit and stock performance. The findings 
suggest that companies that add women in the board of directors do not experience any 
increase or decrease in profits, implying that women directors have no impact in profits. 
On the other side, the change in the number of female board membership appears to be 
significant for institutional investors. This is explained by the adverse effect of women 
directors on stock price as institutional investors are more likely to sell their stocks in 
response to appointments of new female directors. As a result, women in the board of 
directors have a significant negative impact on stock value of the firm. Furthermore, the 
influence of female directors on the performance of the firm depends on how long they 
stay in the board of directors. This implies that other observable characteristic should be 
controlled and taken in consideration in order to address properly any potential 
endogeneity problem. 
 
3.6 The average age of directors  and firm performance  
 
(Wiersema and Bantel, 1992) focus on the demographic characteristics of the board and 
their influence on firm strategic decisions. Age of board members represents on of the 
demographic variables chosen for the study.  Using a sample of 100 firms for the year 
1983, the paper reports a negative relationship between average age of board members 
and the changes in corporate strategies. This result shows strong support for the positive 
impact of young boards which tend to be proactive, creative and innovative. Moreover, 
young directors on board are more likely to undertake risks and accept major changes in 
the process of decision-making compared to older directors. As a consequence, a low 
average age of board members is necessary to provide major strategic changes that lead 
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to outcomes and performance improvements for the firm. Nevertheless, no significant 
association is found between age diversity and the strategic change.   
 
3.7 Tax management  
 
The audit committee assists the Board of directors in accomplishing its roles and 
responsibilities toward the shareholders. Moreover, the audit committee is assigned the 
responsibility for managing risks and reviewing the financial reporting of the firm, its 
internal and disclosure control, tax compliance etc. Firms characterized by better quality 
of financial reporting and disclosure transparency are more likely to diminish their 
agency problems. Taking in consideration the crucial position of the audit committee in a 
firm, the Blue Ribbon Committee (1999) published a guideline on the importance of the 
audit committee and on ways to improve its performance and effectiveness. A significant 
part of the report is dedicated to the committee composition and competencies that its 
members should posses such as independence, experience and financial literacy.  
However, few studies have focused on the important role of the audit committee in a 
firm. (Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005), provide an empirical research that links the board 
of directors and audit committee with financial disclosure practices and management 
forecast. The testing is conducted using a sample of 275 firms published in Fortune 500 
for the period 1995 to 2000. Audit committee activity, size, and independence, together 
with the audit committee financial experts represent the variables of audit committee.  
The authors provide evidence that firms consisting of large audit committee size, higher 
proportion of financial experts and higher committee activity are more likely to make less 
precise management forecast. Hence, effective board and audit committee are related 
with less precise forecast. Possible explanations of this result are firstly, well governed 
firms try not to misinform the shareholders and secondly, these firms are aware of the 
threat of legal procedures against the board of directors. However, effective audit 
committee with a higher proportion of financial experts and independent members, lead 
to a higher level of forecast accuracy and positive market reactions. This implies also a 
higher financial disclosure.  
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But how does tax management affect firm value? (Desai and Dharmapala, 2005) examine 
the effect of tax avoidance on firm value. As a measure of firm value is used Tobin’s Q 
and book-tax gap is used as a measure of tax avoidance. The empirical testing rejects the 
hypothesis that corporate tax avoidance increases firm value. Moreover, the findings 
predict that the influence of tax avoidance activity on firm value is higher in well-
governed firms and lower in less well-governed firms. This implies that in well-governed 
firms, the managers with undertake tax avoidance activities only if it is sufficiently 
profitable for the firm. Meanwhile, in poorly-governed firms, managers are less 
motivated to carry out tax avoidance activities as they have higher opportunities to be 
engaged in renting process.  
(Minnick and Noga, 2010) present broader insights on how executive and directors 
compensation drive managers toward a better performance and how the improved 
performance influences tax management, in a long run perspective. Throughout the 
paper, the authors focus on pay-performance sensitivity which represents the change in 
manager’s wealth for a unit change in equity value.  According to the empirical findings, 
pay-performance sensitivity offers incentives for executives and directors to concentrate 
their attention on finding better strategies to improve tax management. Nevertheless, tax 
management strategies are developed in accordance to the specific characteristics of the 
governance structure of the firm. Firm with independent boards give priority and rely 
more on foreign tax management, meanwhile other firms with larger board of directors 
favor more domestic tax management. Importantly, the analysis is driven by observing 
the long term influence of incentive compensation on long term tax management. The 
empirical findings show that better tax managements bring advantages for shareholders 
and increase their returns in the long run.  
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Chapter 4  
 
Research Hypothesis  
 
The purpose of this paper is to explore the relationship of corporate governance measures 
with firm performance and tax fees. A large body of previous literature is consistent with 
the finding that corporate governance mechanisms influence top manager’s decisions. 
When these decisions are not in line with the shareholder’s interest, they might lead to a 
conflict of interests between shareholders and managers, referred as the agency problem. 
A serious conflict between these two parties may damage the effectiveness of corporate 
governance and brings negative impacts for the company such as reduction of 
shareholder’s wealth and increase of agency costs which are certainly not consistent with 
the objective of maximizing the firm value. On the other hand, when a given governance 
mechanism influences the managers’ decisions to be in accordance with shareholders’ 
interests, than this might lead to a better performance for the company and can positively 
impact its value.  
As corporate governance indicators we will examine how the board of directors’ size, 
activity and composition influences the effectiveness of the company’s corporate 
governance. Many previous empirical studies have overlooked each of these indicators 
separately; instead we will evaluate all of them in order to bring more complete 
explanations. However, consistent with the prior findings, we expect the size of board of 
directors to be inversely related with the firm performance and its activity to be 
negatively associated with profitability indicators. As a result, a well governed firm is 
characterized by a small board and lower frequency of board of director’s meeting (lower 
board activity). In addition to this, we will highlight some other aspects of corporate 
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governance indicators concerning financial reporting and audit services. Fewer researches 
present the impact of Audit committee composition and diversity in the amount of tax 
fees. In accordance with previous literature, we expect that the audit committee activity 
and size is negatively related with the amounts of tax fees. Meanwhile, the number of 
financial experts in the audit committee is assumed to impact positively the tax fees.  
 
In the following part, we will draw some hypothesis and will try to prove their validity 
conducting the respective regression analysis. 
 
Hypothesis 1. Board of director’s size is negatively related with firm performance  
 
Board size is a variable that influences the firm value. (Yermack, 1996) showed that there 
is an inverse relationship between board size and firm performance. He found that small 
boards of directors are more effective and they demonstrate better values of financial 
ratios. Moreover, it is more likely that the smaller is the board, the better is the 
communication and the easier is to reach an agreement. 
 
Hypothesis 2. Board of director’s activity (number of board meetings) affects 
negatively firm performance. 
 
Board activity measured by the number of board meetings is also another variable that 
influences firm performance. (Vafeas, 1999) found that firms with lowest number of 
board meetings demonstrate the highest price to book value, which implies a negative 
relationship between the board meeting frequency and firm performance. In this view, 
boards that meet more frequently are likely to reflect that the firm is experiencing 
problems. In addition, board of directors increases the activity in response to past poor 
performance. 
 
Hypothesis 3. Insider ownership is positively related with firm performance. 
 
The higher is the insider ownership, the higher is the percentage of stocks held by 
directors and executives. This implies that the more this group participates in the equity, 
the higher are their incentives to have a better firm performance. 
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Hypothesis 4. Younger boards of directors lead to an increase in firm performance. 
 
 (Wiersema and Bantel, 1992) showed that boards characterized by lower average age 
have better performance. This finding is explained by the fact that young boards are more 
willing to undertake innovative strategies and risky investments; therefore they result in a 
higher firm value. Hence, we assume that there is a negative relationship between 
average age of the directors that serve on the board and firm performance. 
 
Hypothesis 5. The proportion of independent directors is positively related with firm 
performance. 
 
Boards of directors with a high proportion of independent are an indication of strong 
management and governance mechanisms. In addition, having independent directors in 
the board reduces agency problems and tends to improve monitoring and controlling. 
When firms have lower profitability, they are more likely to add independent directors in 
the board and remove insiders (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1988). In accordance with this 
result, we expect a positive relationship between board independence and firm 
performance. Firms that survived the crisis had a higher fraction of independent directors 
on board ( Byrd, Fraser, Lee and Williams, 2001) 
 
Hypothesis 6. The percentage of women on the board of directors has a positive 
impact on firm value. 
 
The presence of women in the board of directors is assumed to improve the attendance 
records and their behavior influences positively the monitoring process. (Adams and 
Ferreira, 2009) found that female directors significantly influence the firm outcomes. 
This pattern is consistent with the interpretation that female directors are focused more on 
quality strategies and productivity and their presence improves the monitoring and 
controlling process. 
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Hypothesis 7. Board of directors’ activity and audit committee activity are positively 
related with tax fees. 
 
According to this hypothesis, we expect that a higher frequency of board and audit 
committee meetings implies higher tax fees to be paid. 
 
Hypothesis 8. The proportion of financial experts in the audit committee is positively 
related with tax fees. 
 
According to the regulations of the Securities and Exchange Commission, at least one 
member of the Audit Committee in a firm should be an “audit committee financial 
expert”. Firms with a high number of financial experts in the audit committee are 
associated with higher financial disclosure which reflects effective corporate governance 
(Karamenou and Vafeas, 2005). 
 
Hypothesis 9: Board of director’s size and audit committee size are positively related 
with tax fees  
 
Firms with small boards are assumed to have better performance which might indicate 
fewer amounts of fees paid to auditors. The same can be concluded for the audit 
committee size. 
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Chapter 5  
 
Methodology 
 
5.1 Sample and data description 
 
In the present research paper, we will focus on the corporate governance model of Anglo-
Saxon countries because our analysis will be conducted using a sample of firms from 
S&P 500 index. This index includes 500 public American corporations considered as 
leaders in the industries in which they operate. The present study will be focused on a 
sample of 680 observations for 136 firms of the above index between 2005 and 2009.  
Corporate governance of these companies is adopted in accordance with their Corporate 
Governance guidelines and charters of the Board committee. Charters of the Board 
committee provide the framework of the leadership structure. Most of these companies 
have four main Committees: Compensation, Audit, Finance, and Nominating and 
Governance; which present an integral part of the governance structure. Each of the 
committee reports and recommends any possible change in relation with the matters for 
which they are responsible. 
We should note here that companies of S&P 500 index operate in different industries 
such as Health Care, Materials, Utilities, Energy, Information Technology, 
Telecommunications Services, Consumer Discretionary, Consumer Staples and 
Financials. In order to have more consistent results, our study will not include the 
companies that offer financial services with the Standard Industrial Classification codes 
6000-6999. For example we exclude insurance companies since they have a special type 
of activity and operate in a different regulated environment, which is likely to influence 
their performance and reduce the importance of the corporate governance mechanisms.  
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5.2 Source of data 
 
5.2.1 Definitive Proxy Statement - DEF 14A 
 
Under the regulation rules that conduct securities industry in the U.S, investors and other 
participants in capital markets should have access to market information before they carry 
out their investment decisions. For this purpose, public companies are required by U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission to release accurate financial and non-financial 
information to the public. Being the most important regulator authority in the U.S 
securities market, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission aims to promote 
transparency and efficiency which is very crucial for the country’s economy. In this 
perspective, public companies submit period reports with the Commission. Most of these 
reports and other forms have to be filed electronically through EDGAR database (the 
Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval system) which is the largest source of 
the information disclosed by companies. 
According to the purpose of our research, we will examine the DEF 14A Form which 
contains useful information about the Proxy Statement, published by the companies prior 
to their annual meeting. This proxy statement is filed in accordance with the solicitation 
of proxies by the company’s Board of Directors. For this reason, the company furnishes 
the shareholders with proxy materials and other information that describe the issues to be 
discussed upon at the meeting. This notice is considered to be very useful for 
shareholders before the voting process because it introduces the nominees for election as 
directors and other important matters that have to be approved by the board.  
Additionally, DEF 14A Form provides detailed information about the governance of the 
company. The framework of corporate governance is built based on the company’s 
corporate governance guidelines in combination with Board Committee charters. The 
committee charters give information about the roles and responsibilities of Board of 
Directors, Compensation committee, Audit committee, Finance committee and 
Nominating and Governance committee. Moreover, each of these committees assists the 
board in fulfilling its functions by providing specific annual reports with respect to their 
roles. 
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5.2.2 Corporate Governance variables 
 
Having the information provided in DEF 14A forms, filed by each company of S&P500 
index on a yearly basis, we will create a database consisting of number of directors on the 
board, number of meeting during the fiscal year, the proportion of shares owned by the 
directors and executives as a group, the proportion of insiders and independent directors, 
the average age of directors, gender diversity on board and other information regarding 
the audit committee characteristics such as number of financial experts and committee 
size and additionally number of meetings per fiscal year.  
Using this database which allows us to present the governance indicators as explanatory 
variables, we will examine the influence of board of director’s structure (size and 
composition) on the firm performance. Definitions of all governance variables used in 
this study are given below: 
 
 
 Board of Directors Size  
This variable refers to the total number of members in the board of directors 
(inclusive independent directors) attending the annual meetings held during each 
fiscal year. 
 
 Board of Directors Meetings 
This variable measures the number of regular meetings held by the board of 
directors during each fiscal year. This is the variable that mainly represents the 
board of director’s activity. The meetings refer only to those held in person, 
excluding the telephonic ones. 
 
 Insider Ownership 
This variable measures the percentage of common stock, relative to the common 
stock outstanding, beneficially owned by all directors and executive officers as a 
group. 
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 Audit Committee Meetings 
This variable measures the number of regular meetings held by the Audit 
Committee during each fiscal year. 
 
 Audit committee financial experts 
Under the Securities and Exchange Commission’s rules, in public companies at 
least one member of the audit committee should be a financial expert. In case the 
public company does not have a financial expert in its audit committee, according 
to the rule, the public company is required to disclose this fact and explain why it 
does not have an audit committee financial expert. The Blue Ribbon Committee 
(1999) recommends the presence of a member with accounting or related 
financial management expertise for having an effective audit committee.  
 
 Audit Committee size 
This variable refers to the total number of members (insiders and independent) in 
the Audit Committee.  
      
 Average age of Board members 
This variable measures the average age of board of director’s members as a    
potential variable that might influence the decision making and monitoring 
process of firms. 
 
 Gender diversity 
This variable gives information about the gender composition of the board. In the 
present study it will show the proportion of women in the Board of Directors.  
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 Insider  Directors 
Insiders are the directors that participate in the day to day running of the 
company. They work full time in the company and are responsible for the 
achievement of operational and strategic objectives. For example, the CEO 
represents an inside director.  
 
 Gray  Directors 
This variable refers to those directors that have extensive business activities with 
the company but do work full time for it. This category of directors includes 
lawyers, company consultants etc. The proxy statements submitted by S&P 500 
index firms do not provide any information about their gray directors. As a result, 
we will categorize the directors in two groups, insiders (non – independent) and 
outsider (independent) directors. 
 
 Independent Directors 
Independent directors represent the category of directors that are not employed in 
the company and do not have any material relationship with it. These directors are 
in the role of monitors of the boards. They are also called outsiders or external 
directors. In the present study, board independence is measured by the proportion 
of independent directors to the board size. 
 
 
The above definitions about the independence of directors have to be complemented also 
by the definition relating to corporate governance, given by NYSE and National 
Association of Securities Dealers (NASD). More specifically, according to NASD and 
NYSE Rulemaking, 2003
1
 it is specified that a director of the board or of the audit 
committee from is disqualified from being independent when: 
                                                 
1
 Securities and Exchange Commission Release - No. 34-48745; File Nos. SR-NYSE-
2002-33, SR-NASD-2002-77, SR-NASD-2002-80, SR-NASD-2002-138, SR-NASD-
2002-139, and SR-NASD-2002-141 
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1- He is an employee, or whose immediate family member is an executive officer, of 
the company. 
 
2- He receives, or whose immediate family member receives, more than $100,000 
per year in direct compensation from the listed company, except for certain 
permitted payments. 
 
3- He is affiliated with or employed by, or whose immediate family member is 
affiliated with or employed in a professional capacity by, a present or former 
internal or external auditor of the company. 
 
4- He is employed, or whose immediate family member is employed, as an executive 
officer of another company where any of the listed company's present executives 
serve on that company's compensation committee. 
 
5- He is an executive officer or an employee, or whose immediate family member is 
an executive officer of a company that makes payments to, or receives payments 
from, the listed company for property or services in an amount which, in any 
single fiscal year, exceeds the greater of $1 million or 2% of such other 
company's consolidated gross revenues. 
 
Besides the corporate governance measures, we retrieve from EDGAR database also 
the following information about the variable related with the tax fees:  
 
 Tax  fees 
This variable represents the fees and expenses for professional services rendered by 
the chosen independent auditors in accordance with U.S. and foreign tax compliance 
assistance, consultation and special advice on diverse foreign tax issues, transfer 
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pricing documentation for compliance matters and advice concerning to customs and 
other relevant duties. 
 
 
5.2.3 Financial variables  
 
In our research, we will use two proxies of corporate performance, ROA as an accounting 
performance measure and price to book value ratio as a market measure. These financial 
data are collected from Reuter’s database.  The first ratio is taken as given in the table of 
historical ratios published by each company. Meanwhile, the price to book ratio is based 
on our own computation having given Book Value of Equity per Share and the share 
price in the end of each of fiscal year. On the other hand, the amount of tax fees will be 
taken as given in the proxy statements.  
 
Below we define each of the variables that will measure respectively the firm’s 
performance: 
 
 ROA - Return on assets measures the profit that has been generated from 
company’s assets. This performance indicator represents the accounting profit and 
shows what the management has achieved in a certain period of time. The higher 
the percentage of ROA, the more profitable is the company and the better is the 
usage of assets to turn them into profits: 
     
               ROA = Net income / Average total assets 
 
 Price to Book ratio – compares the company’s book value with its current share 
price. Higher price to book ratio is an indicator that the investors perceive the 
company as valuable. It is concerned to be one of the most widely quoted 
financial measures of firm’s value. It represents a crucial figure for investors who 
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judge whether the firm is under or overvalued. To calculate price to book ratio we 
take the share price in the end of each fiscal year and divide by the Book Value of 
Equity per Share: 
 
       Price/Book ratio = Price Value per share / Book Value per share 
 
 
5.2.4 Control variables  
 
In our study we will examine at what level the corporate governance indicators determine 
firm performance. However, the variation in firm performance is not fully explained by 
governance measures and we expect that other unobserved factors are contained in the 
error term.  As a result, it is crucial to account for these factors that might be directly 
related with performance. In order to draw causal conclusions about the return on assets, 
price to book value or tax fees, which represent our dependent variables, we will include 
in the regression the following control variables: 
 
 Leverage ratio – provides information about the debt amount used by a company 
to run its activity. This ratio is essential for determining the cost of capital of the 
company. As a result, we consider it to have a significant impact on profitability 
and performance. 
 
            Leverage ratio = Total Debt / Total Assets 
 
 Firm size – as a proxy for firm size we will use the volumes of sales for each 
firm divided by the total assets. We will use the ratio of sales to assets in order for 
the firm size variable to be a comparable measure with the ratio of price to book 
value and return to assets that are used as dependent variables. In the same line, 
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when we will examine the influence of governance indicators on tax fees, we will 
use as a proxy for firm size the volumes of sales.  
  
 
 
In the present paper will make use of several empirical methods, frequently applied for 
panel data such as pooled OLS, random effect and fixed effect specification. In order to 
find the empirical model that best approximates the relationship of governance indicators 
with firm performance and tax fees, we apply first the pooled OLS method. On the 
obtained results we conduct several tests such as testing for heteroskedasticity and serial 
correlation. The results show that the pooled OLS is not an appropriate estimation 
method for the present study. We introduce random effect model as a method that 
corrects for heterosckedasticity and serial correlation. Nevertheless, when applying 
Hausman test we find out that the random effect estimates are not consistent. We also 
check for multicollinearity in order to ensure that there is no significant correlation 
among variables. We use the fixed effect specification and conclude that the results are 
more appropriate. Before applying the fixed effect estimation, we analyze the OLS 
residuals which indicate that for 3 firms the difference between the fitted and actual value 
is very high. Thus, out of 136, we remove 3 firms that have the residual in excess of 2.5 
standard errors. As a result, the fixed effect specification is performed on a sample of 133 
firms over the period 2005 to 2009. The fixed effect method is used mostly because it 
provides unbiased results and additionally it controls for any unobservable characteristic 
that is likely to affect the dependent variable. In this context, using the fixed effect 
method we determine the influence of unobserved components, others than board 
composition, board size, board of director’s activity, on the firm performance and tax 
fees. As a result, we also correct the results provided by OLS, in case of existence of 
some individual-firm characteristics that are not taken in consideration in the model (as 
firms belong to different industries and operate in different regulated environment).  
Previous researches on corporate governance utilize various estimation methods. The 
results obtained are usually sensitive to the method applied. (Yermack, 1996) estimates 
least square regressions to investigate the association between board size and firm value. 
In addition, he introduces the fixed-effect approach and compares the results with OLS 
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estimates. (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1988), utilizes the same methods when examining 
the determinants of board composition. On the other hand, (Vafeas, 1999) estimates the 
relation of board activity with firm performance using two-stage least squares (2SLS) 
framework. Instead, (Bhagat and Black, 2000) run both OLS and three-stage least squares 
(3SLS) regression. (Barnhard and Rosenstein, 1998) apply a three equation instrumental 
variables approach which is more general than 3SLS. The results appear to be sensitive 
according to changes in instruments. The usage of 2SLS or 3SLS is undertaken in cases 
when corporate governance indicators such as board composition or ownership are 
endogenous. As a result, when any of these variables in correlated with some 
unobservable factors included in the error term, the OLS results become inconsistent. 
Thus, a solution would be to find an instrument that is highly correlated with the variable 
but uncorrelated with the error term. However, it may be difficult to find highly relevant 
and valid instrument in all cases.  
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Chapter 6  
 
Empirical results 
  6.1 Descriptive statistics of corporate governance and control variables 
 
Appendix A, table 2 provides summary statistics on corporate governance and financial 
variables. The statistics are shown for each year separately and as totals for all 5 years. 
The board of directors holds on average 7.6 meetings per fiscal year with a standard 
deviation of 3 meetings. The minimum number of meetings in the sample is 3 and the 
maximum is 28. Throughout the 5 years period, the frequency of board meetings has 
remained almost constant. Only in year 2007, board activity was the highest probably in 
response to the necessity to find a solution for the difficulties caused by the global 
financial crisis. 
On average, there are 11 directors that serve on the board with a standard deviation of 2 
directors. The minimum size of the board is 5 members and the maximum is 18. In most 
firms, the number of elected directors should be within a range stated in advance by the 
shareholders. It can be observed that this number remained quite stable from 2005 to 
2009. 
About 85 % of members in the board are independent directors; this implies that the 
boards are predominated by outside directors. There are about 9 independent directors on 
average with a standard deviation of 2 directors. The minimum number of independent 
directors on board is 4 and the maximum is 8. A small percentage of members in board 
are insiders. There are on average 2 insiders in each board with standard deviation of 1 
inside member. Some boards are composed only of independent directors and no insiders. 
During the period 2005-2009, the number of independent directors has remained almost 
unchanged. 
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The percentage of insider ownership has changed slightly from 2005 to 2009 with a mean 
of 7.6 % and standard deviation 13 %. There is a high difference between the minimum 0 
and the maximum 85.4 %. This implies that board directors and executives as a group 
may own more than 50 % of the stocks in the firm which attributes them the majority of 
the ownership. 
On average, the number of women on board does not exceed 2. Standard deviation is 1 
showing that large changes in the gender composition of the board are not possible. 
According to this, most boards are dominated by men. There are boards that have no 
female directors and others that have a maximum number of 6.  
Board members have an average age of 60 years with a standard deviation of 3 years. 
Most of directors are part of the board for long periods of 10 to 15 years. As a result, 
having the same directors in the board implies a constant average age during the 5 years 
period. The younger member is 48 years old and the older one about 70. In general, the 
directors are retired at the age of 72.  
Next, the table displays the characteristics of audit committee. This committee held on 
average 9 meetings per fiscal year with a standard deviation of 3 meetings. This explains 
the important role of this committee taking in consideration that the board holds on 
average 7 meetings. The minimum number of meetings is 3 and the maximum 38. The 
larger difference between the minimum and maximum appears to be in year 2006. In 
other years, the audit committee activity remains the same.  
Each audit committee has on average 2 members with financial expertise. It can be 
reviewed, that throughout the 5 years period the number of financial experts is not less 
than 1 which demonstrated accordance with the rule of Securities and Exchange 
Commission mentioned in previous chapter. The minimum number of financial experts in 
audit committee is 1 and the maximum is 7. 
The audit committee size ranges from 1 to 9. The average number of members in the 
committee is 4 with a standard deviation of 1 member.  
Tax fees exhibit high fluctuations through time. They have a mean of 1,216,516 and a 
high standard deviation of 2,344,251. The minimum tax fees paid is 0 and the maximum 
is 21,600,000. 
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The last part of the table provides descriptive analysis of financial variables. Price to 
book value exhibits high variation during the sample period. The mean value of this ratio 
is 4.2 and the standard deviation 4.9 reflecting the high dispersion of this financial 
measure. In addition, it varies from very low negative numbers to very high positive 
ones. The minimum value of price to book ratio is -17.27 and the maximum is 79.44. The 
negative price to book ratio is an indication that the respective firm has negative 
shareholder’s equity, so called deficit.  
Return on assets reveals sharp fluctuations during the 5 years period. It varies from minus 
68.61 to 61.06 while the average ratio is 8.12 and the standard deviation is 8.08. Such 
fluctuations could be the result of financial turmoil shocks that negatively impacted firm 
profits.  
The capital structure of the sample firms is composed of 54 % debt with standard 
deviation of 18 %. This means that firms can increase further their leverage by relying 
more on debt than equity. However, there are firms that rely only on equity and others 
that choose debt as part of their capital structure. Firm size measured by sales to assets 
ratio appears to be stable from 2005 to 2009. The average ratio is 1.24 and standard 
deviation 0.92. 
 
In order to enhance our understanding on how the financial variables fluctuate together 
during the period, we will plot the times series in one graph. Some interesting results are 
given in the below figure. Figure 3 shows price to book value and ROA in a time series 
plot. These ratios are both used as empirical proxies for firm performance but as we will 
discover in the next chapter their relationship with governance indicators is different. 
Price to book value represents a market performance measure; meanwhile ROA is an 
accounting based measure. From the figure, price to book value varies less and it reflects 
mostly the stock price of firms. It also can be observed the two extreme values of this 
ratio, the maximum 79.44 and the minimum -17.27, that we will exclude from the 
analysis as outliers. On the other hand, it can be observed that ROA exhibits sharp 
fluctuations throughout the 5 years period. Importantly, it goes from very low negative 
values to very high positive ones. This can be attributed to the recent financial turmoil 
which negatively impacted many major U.S companies. Years 2005 to 2007 were 
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considered to be a period of high profits and substantial growth for them, but 2008 
brought radical recessions and as a consequence negative net incomes; displayed in the 
figure by negative values of ROA. Therefore, it is difficult to find a normal pattern of 
ROA that can be explained by corporate governance indicators. As a consequence, it 
would be hard to find a perfect fit between this measure of firm performance and the 
governance variables.  
 
Figure 3: Time series plot price to book value, ROA 
 
Source: Gretl 
 
We will show in the continuance of the present paper, that using ROA instead of price to 
book value, as a proxy of firm performance, brings substantially different regression 
results.  
The next figure shown below provides the scatter plot for the relationship between price 
to book value and one of the governance variables, board size.  The information about the 
number of members on board was retrieved from the proxy statements published by the 
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firms in the end of each fiscal year for the period 2005 to 2009. It can be observed that 
for board with 7 to 10 directors, the price to book values range between 0 and 20. 
Meanwhile for board composed of more than 12 directors, the value of price to book ratio 
falls the interval between 0 and 10. The highest value of price to book ratio corresponds 
to a board composed of 8 to 10 directors. Importantly, any increase of the board by 2 or 
more directors when the board has reached the size of 10 members, leads to a continuous 
decrease in firm value. It can be pointed out that boards with more than 16 directors 
appear to have very low performance in terms of price to book value ratio. 
 
Figure 4: Price to book value and board size 
 
 
Source: Gretl 
 
Figure 4 demonstrates to be is in the same line with the findings of previous researches. 
Firms with a small board of directors are more likely to exhibit higher values of price to 
book ratio, and as a consequence a higher performance.  
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    6.2 Regression analysis – firm performance and corporate governance 
 
In order to investigate whether corporate governance indicators influence firm 
performance and tax fees, we will estimate the empirical models by: 
 
1) Pooled OLS 
2) Random Effects Estimator (Generalized Least Squares) 
3) Fixed Effect Estimator  
 
 
In the beginning, we will examine the relationship between firm performance and 
corporate governance variables using price to book value as the dependent variable and 
board meetings, board size, insider ownership, gender and age as explanatory variables. 
In addition to governance measures, the regression includes two control variables that we 
expect to influence price to book to value. The general form of the regression is: 
 
Price to book value = β0+β1 Board_Meetings+β2 Board_Size+β3 Insider Ownership+ 
β4 Age +β5 Independent Directors + β6 Gender + β7 Firm size+ β8 Leverage+ ε. 
 
 
 Price to book value – Dependent Variable  
 β0 – Price to book value when all variables are 0 meaning the firm value with no 
board of directors, no sales and no debt. 
 β1  - Parameter of board meetings 
 β2  - Parameter of board size 
 β3  - Parameter of insider ownership 
 β4  - Parameter of average age of directors in the board 
 β5  - Parameter of proportion of independent directors in the board 
 β6  - Parameter of proportion of women in the board 
 β7  - Parameter of firm size  
 β8  - Parameter of leverage  
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Model 1: Pooled OLS, using 680 observations 
Included 136 cross-sectional units 
Time-series length = 5 
Dependent variable: Price_to_book_value 
 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
const 15.5181 3.76911 4.1172 0.00004 *** 
Board_Meetings -0.00672987 0.0610728 -0.1102 0.91229  
Board_Size -0.318157 0.092235 -3.4494 0.00060 *** 
Insider_Ownersh 0.0255642 0.0145762 1.7538 0.07992 * 
Age -0.233505 0.057751 -4.0433 0.00006 *** 
Independent Direct 2.5534 1.92969 1.3232 0.18621  
Gender 3.75183 2.16166 1.7356 0.08309 * 
Firm_Size 0.068514 0.200776 0.3412 0.73303  
Leverage 6.12159 0.998049 6.1336 <0.00001 *** 
R-squared   0.110120 Adjusted R-squared 0.099511 
 
Durbin-Watson   0.701009 
***  Significant with 99% confidence level 
**   Significant with 95% confidence level 
*     Significant with 90% confidence level 
 
 
Using 680 observations, we estimated the following regression line by Pooled OLS 
method: 
 
Price to book value = 15.5181–0.0067*Board_Meetings–0.3181*Board_Size 
            + 0.0255*Insider_Ownership – 0. 0.2335Age+2.5534*Independ_Director 
            +3.7518*Gender+0.0685*Firm_size+ 6.1215*Leverage+ ε 
 
According to the above results, it can be pointed out that the constant and coefficients of 
board size, age and leverage are significantly different from zero; more precisely they are 
different from zero with 99 % confidence level. Insider ownership and gender are 
significantly different from zero with 90 % confidence level. Other variables appear not 
to be significant. It can be observed that R-squared is very low and it explains about 11 % 
of the variation in price to book value.                                                                      
The following graph plots the OLS residuals by observation number. It can be reviewed 
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that there is a high dispersion of residuals for some firms in the range 15-29. In addition, 
the analysis of actual and fitted values shows that the residuals for these firms are in 
excess of 2.5 standard errors. Hence, we will remove 3 firms considered as outliers in 
order to improve our model.  
 
Figure 5: Regression residuals (actual versus fitted) 
 
 
Source:Gretl 
 
After the removal of the outliers we will estimate the OLS regression model on the 
remained 133 firms (665 observations) over a 5 years period. The results are presented 
below in Model 2. It can be observed that the constant, age and leverage are significantly 
different from zero with 99 % confidence level. Additionally, board size and gender 
appears to be significant with 95 % confidence level. Other variables such as board 
meetings, board independence and firm size are proven not to be significant.  
R-squared is very low and it explains only 6.1 % of the variation in price to book value 
indicating that OLS provides a poor fit to the data. 
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Model 2: Pooled OLS, using 665 observations 
Included 133 cross-sectional units 
Time-series length = 5 
Dependent variable: Price_to_book_value 
 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
const 10.1108 2.18168 4.6344 <0.00001 *** 
Board_Meetings 0.00530103 0.034525 0.1535 0.87802  
Board_Size -0.113883 0.052761 -2.1585 0.03125 ** 
Insider_Ownersh 0.00573927 0.00828126 0.6930 0.48853  
Age -0.115355 0.0336119 -3.4320 0.00064 *** 
Independent_Dir 0.360587 1.0946 0.3294 0.74194  
Gender 2.71793 1.22319 2.2220 0.02662 ** 
Firm_Size -0.0831652 0.113445 -0.7331 0.46377  
Leverage 2.42812 0.592547 4.0978 0.00005 *** 
Sum squared residuals       4481.358 
R-squared   0.061413 Adjusted R-squared 0.049967 
Durbin-Watson 0.355821 
*** Significant with 99% confidence level 
**   Significant with 95% confidence level 
*    Significant with 90% confidence level 
 
It is useful at this point to establish whether the classical linear model assumptions are 
satisfied. This is important in order to determine that the above OLS estimator is best 
linear unbiased estimator. We conclude if OLS estimator is best linear unbiased estimator 
by relying crucially on the homoskedasticity assumption. In cases when 
heteroskedasticity is present, it possible to find more efficient estimators than those of 
OLS. In the present study, we will detect the presence of heteroskedasticity by reporting 
heteroskedasticity-robust standart error with the usual OLS and review the differences in 
the standard errors. 
The results reveal differences in the significance of variables; variables are no longer 
significant. Substantial changes appear also between some of the usual standard errors 
and the robust standard errors. For example, the usual standard error for gender is 1.22 
while the robust standard error is 3.35 and the usual t statistic is about 2.22, while the 
robust t is about 0.81. The same can be pointed out for board size variable; its usual 
standard error is 0.052 comparing with the robust standard error of 0.10 and the usual t 
statistic is -2.15, while the robust t is -1.12. Considerable differences appear also for the 
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leverage variable; its usual standard error is 0.59 while the robust standard error is 1.33 
and the t statistic is about 4.09, while the robust t is 1.82. 
 
Model 3: Pooled OLS, using 665 observations 
Included 133 cross-sectional units 
Time-series length = 5 
Dependent variable: Price_to_book_value 
Robust (HAC) standard errors 
 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
const 10.1108 4.00944 2.5217 0.01191 ** 
Board_Meetings 0.00530103 0.0409833 0.1293 0.89712  
Board_Size -0.113883 0.101551 -1.1214 0.26251  
Insider_Ownersh 0.00573927 0.0213536 0.2688 0.78819  
Age -0.115355 0.0537358 -2.1467 0.03218 ** 
Independent_Dir 0.360587 2.14146 0.1684 0.86633  
Gender 2.71793 3.35923 0.8091 0.41875  
Firm_Size -0.0831652 0.19495 -0.4266 0.66981  
Leverage 2.42812 1.33325 1.8212 0.06903 * 
R-squared 0.061413 Adjusted R-squared 0.049967 
*** Significant with 99% confidence level 
**   Significant with 95% confidence level 
*    Significant with 90% confidence level 
 
These results might be an evidence for presence of heteroskedasticity which makes OLS 
no longer the best linear unbiased estimator. In order to conclude about this we will test 
heteroskedasticity. For this purpose we will save the squared OLS residuals from the first 
equation output and regress it on the same variables: 
 
ε2 = δ 0+ δ1Board_Meetings + δ2Board_size+δ3Insider_Ownership+ δ4age  
      + δ5 ratio_indep+ δ6 ratio_gender+ δ7firmsize+ δ8leverage 
 
Under the null hypothesis, heteroskedasticity is not present.  
H0: δ0 = δ1= δ2= δ3= δ4= δ5 = δ6= δ7= δ8 =0 (homoskedasticity) 
HA: at least one of the deltas is significant (heteroskedasticity) 
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Model 4: Pooled OLS, using 665 observations 
Included 133 cross-sectional units 
Time-series length = 5 
Dependent variable: sq_residuals 
 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
const -6.51306 16.2311 -0.4013 0.68835  
Board_Meetings 0.0891651 0.256856 0.3471 0.72860  
Board_Size -0.758526 0.392526 -1.9324 0.05374 * 
Insider_Ownersh 0.128687 0.0616101 2.0887 0.03712 ** 
Age -0.21742 0.250063 -0.8695 0.38491  
Independent_Dir 22.0241 8.14348 2.7045 0.00702 *** 
Gender 35.3273 9.10017 3.8820 0.00011 *** 
Firm_Size -0.636816 0.843994 -0.7545 0.45080  
Leverage 19.0031 4.40838 4.3107 0.00002 *** 
R-squared 0.081197 Adjusted R-squared 0.069992 
*** Significant with 99% confidence level 
**  Significant with 95% confidence level 
*   Significant with 90% confidence level 
 
We reject the null hypothesis (reject homoscedasticity) if the test statistics is higher than 
the critical value.  
 
 
The F statistic is 7.23 and is higher the than critical value (the 1% critical value is 2.53). 
Thus we reject the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity. This means that 
heteroskedasticity is present and the usual standard errors reported in the first model are 
not reliable and OLS is not best linear unbiased estimator.  
Additionally, we suspect some serial correlation when observing the value of Durbin 
Watson test that is equal to 0.35. This value is lower than 1.84 (lower bound) for number 
of observations n=665 and number of regressors k=8. Thus, it can be pointed out that 
there is serial correlation.                         
It is of special importance to detect also if multicollinearity problem is present. Hence, 
we will check if two or more explanatory variables are highly correlated with each other. 
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Using Appendix A, table 1 and 2 we can calculate the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) 
that measures the degree of multicollinearity, according to the below formula: 
 
VIF(i) = 1/(1 - R(i)^2)    where R(i) is the multiple correlation coefficient between 
variable i and the other independent variables.  
In Appendix C, table 1 we provide the values of VIF which appear to be less than 5. 
Hence, we can conclude that the degree of multicollinearity is not sufficient to cause any 
concern about the regression variables. 
 
At this stage, the presence of heteroskedasticity and serial correlation invalidates the first 
OLS model. Thus, we should think of an alternative estimation method that corrects it 
and gives reliable and valid results. Generalized Least Squares is a method that accounts 
for heteroskedasticity in the errors serial correlation. Therefore, the Generalized Least 
Squares estimators are necessarily more efficient than the OLS estimators.  
Using the same dependent and explanatory variables, the GLS estimates are given as 
below: 
 
Model 5: Random-effects (GLS), using 665 observations 
Included 133 cross-sectional units 
Time-series length = 5 
Dependent variable: Price_to_book_value 
 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
const 12.6294 2.47715 5.0983 <0.00001 *** 
Board_Meetings -0.0014757 0.0263157 -0.0561 0.95530  
Board_Size -0.169106 0.0618035 -2.7362 0.00638 *** 
Insider_Ownersh 0.0181355 0.012089 1.5002 0.13405  
Age -0.106709 0.0365045 -2.9232 0.00358 *** 
Independent_Dir -3.86449 1.02389 -3.7743 0.00017 *** 
Gender 0.124871 1.28416 0.0972 0.92257  
Firm_Size 0.206692 0.197212 1.0481 0.29499  
Leverage 4.36652 0.773775 5.6431 <0.00001 *** 
*** Significant with 99% confidence level 
**  Significant with 95% confidence level 
*   Significant with 90% confidence level 
Analyzing the results of model 5, we can point out that the constant, board size, age, 
board independence and leverage are significantly different from zero with 99 % 
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confidence level. Other variables such as board meetings, gender and firm size appear not 
to be statistically significant.  
 
The most questionable assumption of Random Effect model is the absence of correlation 
among the regressors and the individual invariant effects. Therefore is important to check 
whether this assumption is valid in order to have consistent estimators. The following 
results are obtained by running the Random Effects model in Gretl and calculating the 
Hausman test:  
 
H0: GLS estimates are consistent  
HA: GLS estimates are inconsistent 
Asymptotic test statistic: Chi-square(8) = 35.6676 with p-value = 2.01986e-005 
 
 
 
The critical value for χ20.99
  
is 20.0902 and it is lower that the test statistics of 35.6676. 
Hence the null hypothesis is rejected at 1 % significance level. Also, by analyzing the p-
value (2.01986e-005), we can formulate the same conclusion. Based on the results from 
the Hausman test and the p-value it can be concluded that GLS estimates are not 
consistent.  
 
An alternative specification model that does not assume uncorrelation among residuals is 
the Fixed Effect model. This model is very useful in cases when we are focusing in a set 
of individual; in the present study it would be an appropriate specification since we are 
analyzing a set of 136 firms.  
In our study we include firms of different sizes and industries. According to this, we 
suspect that there might be some other unobservable factors capturing firms’ 
characteristics that do not vary over time and affect firm performance. The unobserved 
effect contains things such as director’s financial background, the retirement or resign of 
a chief director, firm diversification (as number of business segments in which it 
operates), the impact of financial crisis on firm’s profits or any takeover. These are 
generally constant over the period of 5 years. Implementing Fixed Effect specification, 
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we will automatically add firm dummies in our regressions and estimate their influence 
on firm value.  
 
The below regression output shows that the results change in an important way. 
 
 
Model 6: Fixed-effects, using 665 observations 
Included 133 cross-sectional units 
Time-series length = 5 
Dependent variable: Price_to_book_value 
 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
const 11.5257 2.98972 3.8551 0.00013 *** 
Board_Meetings -0.000461772 0.0270365 -0.0171 0.98638  
Board_Size -0.198489 0.0733226 -2.7071 0.00701 *** 
Insider_Ownersh 0.0495974 0.0191953 2.5838 0.01004 ** 
Age -0.106793 0.0419306 -2.5469 0.01115 ** 
Independent_Dir -5.0608 1.09841 -4.6074 <0.00001 *** 
Gender 0.0862395 1.47106 0.0586 0.95327  
Firm_Size 1.53288 0.418562 3.6623 0.00028 *** 
Leverage 5.3718 0.998973 5.3773 <0.00001 *** 
Sum squared resid 1134.654 S.E. of regression 1.471520 
R-squared 0.762355 Adjusted R-squared 0.698862 
*** Significant with 99% confidence level 
**  Significant with 95% confidence level 
*   Significant with 90% confidence level 
 
 
Before interpreting the obtained results it is important to test for the joint significance of 
fixed effects. In this case we will prove whether the intercept is same for all firms by 
performing an F test (comparing restricted with unrestricted model). 
 
H0: µ1 = µ2 =…= µN-1 = 0 (common intercept for all firms) 
HA: µi≠0 at least for some i (intercept is different) 
 
Under the alternative hypothesis, i represents the firms and it can take values from 1 to 
133. 
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Test statistics:  
 
 
= 
   
 
RRSS refers to restricted residual sum of squares from pooled OLS that we estimated in 
the previous model. 
URSS represents the unrestricted residual sum of squares from the fixed effects model. 
N represents the number of FIRMS and is equal to 133.  
K represents the number of coefficients and is equal to 8 
T represents the number of years and is equal to 5 
For our model: N (T – 1) - K = 133*(5-1)-8= 524 and N-1=132 
 
As a result, F statistic value is: 
 
 
The F (132, 524) = 11.7088 with p-value = P (F(132, 524) > 11.7088) = 1.16456e-095 is 
higher than the critical value of 1.36021 which has a F distribution with (132, 524) 
degrees of freedom and 1 %  significance level. Therefore, we reject the null hypothesis 
that the intercept is same for firms. Hence, we can conclude that it cannot be the same 
effect across 133 firms.  
Once we have tested the joint significance of the fixed effects and determined that firms 
do not have a common intercept, we form the regression equation based on the estimated 
fixed effect model. 
 53 
Price to book value = 11.5278–0.0004*Board_Meetings–0.1985*Board_Size 
                + 0.0493*Insider_Ownership – 0.1068*Age-5.0579*Independ_Director 
                +0.0847*Gender+1.5321*Firm_size+ 5.3730*Leverage+ ε 
 
The results show that the number board meetings are proven to be not significant 
showing inconsistency with hypothesis 2. Nevertheless, the relationship between the 
frequency of board meeting and price to book value appears to be negative as indicated 
by previous literature (Vafeas, 1999). 
The coefficient of board size is significantly different from zero with 99 % confidence 
level. This variable is inversely related to price to book value reflecting consistency with 
hypothesis 1. We can point out that a decrease in board size by one member leads to an 
increase of price to book ratio by approximately 0.198, holding other variables constant. 
Some possible explanations for this can be that boards with fewer members have better 
communication, organization and coordination; they are more flexible and efficient. 
Furthermore, the process of decision making in small size boards is assumed to be more 
effective and takes less time because the consensus among a group of less directors is 
achieved faster.  However, it does not make sense to reduce the board to zero. All firms 
set in advance the range in which the board size should vary; typically is between 5 to 12 
members. 
Insider ownership is significantly different from zero with 95 % confidence level. The 
variable is positively associated with firm value proving right hypothesis 3. An increase 
of 1 % in the proportion of stocks held by board members and executives as a group leads 
to an increase of 0.05 in price to book value. Intuitively, the higher is the participation of 
board members in equity, the higher is their interest in seeing the stock price increase and 
the higher are their incentives for having better firm performance. 
Average age is statistically significant and reflects consistency with hypothesis 4 since it 
is negatively related with firm performance. According to this result, it can be determined 
that the higher is the average age of the board the lower is the performance or 
alternatively we can say that young boards perform better than old ones. This result can 
be due to the fact that young executives are success oriented and tend to be more eager 
for undertaking risky initiatives. Meanwhile, old executives are more conservative and 
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are not willing to pursue drastic changes in the company. As a result, these managerial 
characteristics with surely be reflected in firm performance.  
Board independence appears to be significantly different from zero with 99 % confidence 
level. The negative sign of the variable is not consistent with our assumption that board 
independence is positively related with firm performance. Thus, it does not prove right 
hypothesis 5.  
Gender does not influence firm performance. Thus, hypothesis 6 is rejected. According to 
this result, having one more women in the board of directors does not have any impact on 
firm performance. In the present model, gender diversity is measured by the proportion of 
women in the board. Another alternative method of measuring the gender diversity effect 
on firm value will be presented in the next chapter. 
Important conclusions can be drawn also about the financial variables. It can be reviewed 
that firm size and leverage are significantly different from zero with 99% confidence 
level. There is a positive relationship between firm size and firm performance. This 
implies that larger firms have higher sales and as a consequence they are likely to have 
higher profitability. In addition to this, it can be observed that the leverage is positively 
related with firm performance. Since leverage represents the percentage debt in the 
capital structure of the firm, it is common sense that it should be directly related with 
price to book value which takes in consideration the book value of shareholder’s equity. 
The higher is the debt load of the firm, the higher is the price to book value. Also, 
increasing debt leads to a higher tax shield and higher savings from taxes for the firm.                                                                                                               
The fixed effect model has a high explanatory power with R-squared 76 % and adjusted- 
R squared 70 %. Thus, we can conclude that the model explains about 76 % of the 
variation in firm performance.  
 
6.3 Regression analysis – tax fees and corporate governance 
 
We will conduct the same analysis as above in order to explore the relationship of tax 
fees with corporate governance indicators. The empirical model will be estimated by 
using Pooled OLS and Fixed Effect specification. 
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In order to develop arguments whether governance mechanisms influence the amount of 
tax fees, we will examine the relationship between tax fees and audit committee 
characteristics. Using log of tax fees as the dependent variable and audit committee 
meeting, audit committee financial experts, audit committee members, board meetings, 
board size and insider ownership as explanatory variables we obtain the below 
relationship:  
 
Log Tax fees = β0+β1 Audit Commitee_Meetings+β2 Audit C_Financial Expert 
+β3 Audit Committee Members+ β4 Board Meetings +β5 Board Size + β6 Insider 
Ownership + β7 Firm size+ β8 Leverage+ ε. 
 
In addition to governance measures, the regression includes two control variables that we 
expect to influence tax fees. Each of the regression coefficients is defined as follows:  
 
 
 Log Tax fees – Dependent Variable  
 β0 – Tax fess value when all variables are 0 meaning there is no audit committee, 
no financial expert, no sales and no debt. 
 β1  - Parameter of Audit Committee Meetings  
 β2  - Parameter of Audit Committee Financial Expert 
 β3  - Parameter of Audit Committee Members 
 β4  - Parameter of board meetings 
 β5  - Parameter of board size 
 β6  - Parameter of insider ownership  
 β7  - Parameter of firm size measured by log sales 
 β8  - Parameter of leverage 
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       Model 7: Pooled OLS, using 609 observations 
Included 133 cross-sectional units 
Time-series length: minimum 1, maximum 5 
Dependent variable: l_tax_Fees 
 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
const 2.69353 1.25223 2.1510 0.03188 ** 
Audit_Committee 
meetings 
-0.0388286 0.0224938 -1.7262 0.08483 * 
Financial_experts 0.119653 0.0524062 2.2832 0.02277 ** 
Audit_Commiteree 
members 
0.029475 0.0684592 0.4305 0.66695  
Board_Meetings 0.0974871 0.0239527 4.0700 0.00005 *** 
Board_Size 0.119878 0.039369 3.0450 0.00243 *** 
Insider_Ownersh -0.00644451 0.00496948 -1.2968 0.19519  
Leverage 0.550776 0.379966 1.4495 0.14771  
Firm_Size 0.345733 0.0596924 5.7919 <0.00001 *** 
R-squared        0.166594 Adjusted R-squared     0.155482 
Durbin-Watson   0.236092 
*** Significant with 99% confidence level 
**  Significant with 95% confidence level 
*   Significant with 90% confidence level 
 
 
The form of the regression equation based on the estimated OLS model is given below: 
 
Log Tax fees = 2.6935-0.0388*Audit Commitee_Meetings 
+0.1196*Audit_C_Financial_Expert+0.1196*Audit_Committee_Members 
+0.0974*Board_Meetings+0.1198*Board_Size-0.0064*Insider_Ownership       
+0.5507*Firm size+ 0.3457*Leverage+ ε. 
 
The results suggest that the coefficients of board meetings, board size and firm size are 
significantly different from zero with 99 % confidence level. Furthermore, the constant 
and the coefficient of financial experts in audit committee appear to be significantly 
different from zero with 95 % confidence level and the coefficient of audit committee 
meetings is significantly different from zero with 90 % confidence level.  Audit 
committee meetings, insider ownership and leverage appear to be insignificant. 
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R squared shows that the model explains only 16.7 % of the variation in the amount of 
tax fees paid to auditors. We should also note that there are 609 observations taken in 
account. This is because 71 of them appeared to be 0 and were excluded from the model 
since it is not possible to calculate the logarithm of non-negative numbers. 
Not consistent with hypothesis 7, audit committee is significant but negatively related to 
tax fees. This result shows that frequent meetings of audit committee lead to lower tax 
fees paid. 
Members of audit committee that are financially literate appear to have a significant and 
positive influence on the amount of tax fees. Since these members have high expertise in 
accounting, this assures accuracy and clarity of financial disclosure in the financial 
statements. Thus, hypothesis 8 is proven right as more financial experts in audit 
committee are linked with higher tax fees. 
The number of members in audit committee is proved to be insignificant. Meanwhile, 
board meeting is significant and positively related with tax fees. This result is in 
consistent with hypothesis 9.  
Board size is also significant and positively linked to tax fees paid, demonstrating 
consistency with hypothesis 9. 
The other variables of insider ownership and leverage are not statistically significant. 
Another important variable is the firm size measured by the log of sales. Used as a 
control variable, firm size is significant and positively related to the amount of tax fees 
paid. It is common sense to conclude that bigger companies pay more taxes than small 
ones.  
 
In the section of descriptive statistics of corporate governance indicators we found out 
high correlations between some variables. More specifically, firm size appeared to be 
correlated with log of tax fees, leverage, and board size. In addition, board size was 
proven to be correlated with audit committee size. Hence, it is possible that some of the 
variables do not show significance because of these correlations. Thus, we will estimate 
another OLS regression including all variables except firm and board size. 
 
The obtained results are shown below: 
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Model 8: Pooled OLS, using 609 observations 
Included 133 cross-sectional units 
Time-series length: minimum 1, maximum 5 
Dependent variable: l_tax_Fees 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
const 10.7019 0.425685 25.1403 <0.00001 *** 
Audit_Committee 
meetings 
-0.0407513 0.0235078 -1.7335 0.08352 * 
Financial_experts 0.133925 0.0547194 2.4475 0.01467 ** 
Audit_Commiteree 
members 
0.206197 0.0651732 3.1638 0.00164 *** 
Board_Meetings 0.0980418 0.0250324 3.9166 0.00010 *** 
Insider_Ownersh -0.00144585 0.00513718 -0.2814 0.77846  
Leverage 1.25069 0.381427 3.2790 0.00110 *** 
R-squared    0.086304 Adjusted R-squared   0.077197 
Durbin-Watson   0.218960 
*** Significant with 99% confidence level 
**  Significant with 95% confidence level 
*   Significant with 90% confidence level 
 
 
The results reported in the above regression exhibit considerable differences with the 
previous model. The coefficient of audit committee meetings appears to be significant 
with 90 % confidence level. However, the negative sign of the variable in this the new 
model is not consistent with hypothesis 8. Audit committee size coefficient is positive 
and significant with 99 %, proving right hypothesis 9. Another variable that exhibits 
significance in the model is leverage. Previously, we indicated that leverage was not 
influencing tax fees. This result was probably caused by the correlation of leverage with 
firm size. In this case, we can conclude leverage influences the amount of tax fees. In 
addition, the coefficient of the number of financial experts in the audit committee exhibits 
the same significance as in previous model. The same can be pointed out for board 
meetings as this variable is significant with 99 % confidence level.   
R squared is smaller and it shows that the model explains only 8.6 % of the variation in 
tax fees. 
An alternative model would be the fixed effect specification. As explained in previous 
section, firms have different size and they belong to various industries. As a result, we 
suspect that there might be some other individual firm effects that influence the amount 
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of taxes paid to auditors. Running fixed effect model excluding again the variables that 
appear to be correlated with each other, we obtain the following results: 
 
 
Model 9: Fixed-effects, using 609 observations 
Included 133 cross-sectional units 
Time-series length: minimum 1, maximum 5 
Dependent variable: l_tax_Fees_ 
 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
const 12.9983 0.39832 32.6327 <0.00001 *** 
Audit_Committee -0.0149709 0.0167323 -0.8947 0.37139  
Financial_exper -0.137387 0.0509859 -2.6946 0.00730 *** 
Audit_Ca 0.13973 0.0539225 2.5913 0.00986 *** 
Board_Meetings 0.0158868 0.0141443 1.1232 0.26193  
Insider_Ownersh -0.0220337 0.00960243 -2.2946 0.02220 ** 
Leverage -0.293274 0.490069 -0.5984 0.54984  
R-squared 0.882255 Adjusted R-squared  0.847683 
*** Significant with 99% confidence level 
**  Significant with 95% confidence level 
*   Significant with 90% confidence level 
 
 
The results from the new model change significantly with the earlier one. Audit 
committee activity is no longer significant. The same can be concluded about board 
meetings and leverage.  
On the other hand, the number of financial experts is more significant than previously. In 
addition, the insider ownership is proven to be significant with 95 % confidence level. 
According to this, the percentage of stocks held by board directors and executives as a 
group seems to be negatively related with tax fees. This can be explained with the fact 
that the higher is the participation of this group on firm capital; fewer taxes will be paid 
by them. 
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Chapter 7 
 
Alternative models of firm performance 
and corporate governance indicators. 
 
 
7.1 Gender as a dummy variable 
 
The previous model estimated by using Fixed Effect specification, the gender variable 
measured by the percentage of women in the board appeared to be insignificant. This 
result is not consistent with prior literature which shows that the presence of woman in 
board of directors makes difference in terms of performance. We will re-estimate the 
fixed effect model for the above equation by presenting gender as a dummy variable. 
Thus, we will assign the value 1 for boards that have at least one female director and 
value 0 for boards composed only of men. The regression output for the new model is 
presented below. The new regression estimates indicate improved results and significance 
for gender. The coefficient of this variable is positive and significantly different from 
zero with 95 % confidence level. This means that the presence of women in the board is 
important rather than their number; appointing another female director in the board has 
no subsequent influence on firm value. From the regression results, it can be observed 
that the difference in price to book value between boards with at least one female 
member with the ones with only men is about 0.77. As a result, we can conclude that 
gender diversity influences performance.  
R-squared is slightly higher compared to the previous model and it explains about 76.5 % 
of the variation in price to book value. 
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Model 10: Fixed-effects, using 665 observations 
Included 133 cross-sectional units 
Time-series length = 5 
Dependent variable: Price_to_book_v 
 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
const 10.9337 2.97166 3.6793 0.00026 *** 
Board_Meetings 0.00517062 0.0269851 0.1916 0.84812  
Board_Size -0.218672 0.0735696 -2.9723 0.00309 *** 
Insider_Ownersh 0.052431 0.0191126 2.7433 0.00629 *** 
Gender 0.786935 0.359345 2.1899 0.02897 ** 
Age -0.108459 0.0417305 -2.5990 0.00961 *** 
Independent_Dir -4.99709 1.09317 -4.5712 <0.00001 *** 
Leverage 5.43866 0.994529 5.4686 <0.00001 *** 
Firm_Size 1.59278 0.414144 3.8460 0.00013 *** 
R-squared 0.764509 Adjusted R-squared 0.701591 
*** Significant with 99% confidence level 
**  Significant with 95% confidence level 
*   Significant with 90% confidence level 
 
Figure 6 below, illustrates price to book values for firms sorted by the proportion of 
women in the board. According to this scatter plot we can determine about the 
relationship between the two variables. Price to book value ranges between 0 and 10 for 
boards with no female directors. Meanwhile, in cases when women are standing in the 
board of directors, the price to book value ranges between 0 and 20 (not taking in 
consideration one case of negative value of price to book ratio). Thus, the presence or 
absence of women in the board matters in terms of firm performance. Can we conclude 
that a higher proportion of women in the board leads to a better firm performance? Not 
necessarily.  From the figure above, it can be observed that increasing the proportion of 
female directors does not suggest an increase in firm performance. Nevertheless, it is 
clear that the presence of women in board but not their number influences firm 
performance. For firms with proportion of women in the board from 10 to 20 %, price to 
book value ranges from 0 to 18. As a result, these firms represent better performance than 
others whose boards are composed only of men. Also, adding more female directors or 
increasing their proportion in the board to 30 or 40 % is not followed by an increase in 
firm value as the price to book ratio remains within same interval 0 to 20 ( without 
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considering the firm whose price to book ratio is higher than 20 for proportion of women 
20%). This is consistent with our regression results; the model where the gender diversity 
was represented by the proportion of women in the board showed no significance for the 
variable of gender. Meanwhile, when gender was introduced as a dummy one, it appeared 
to be significant with 95 % confidence level. 
 
 
Figure 6: Price to book value and gender 
 
Source:Gretl 
 
7.2 ROA as a dependent variable  
 
In Model 6, board meetings frequency was proven to be statistically insignificant when 
determining its influence on price to book ratio. This implies that the level of board 
activity is not valued as important by the market. In this section, we will develop a model 
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that links the intensity of board activity with another measure of firm performance; the 
return on assets. Return on assets represents an accounting measure of firm performance 
compared to price to book value which represents a market measure. Generally, 
institutional investors are the ones that are more interested on this profitability ratio in 
order to control the return of the stockholder's investment. To examine whether corporate 
governance indicators have a significant association with return to assets we estimate the 
following fixed effect model using ROA as the dependent variable and all other 
governance variables as explanatory ones. 
 
Model 11: Fixed-effects, using 680 observations 
Included 136 cross-sectional units 
Time-series length = 5 
Dependent variable: ROA 
 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
const 5.22304 12.0541 0.4333 0.66497  
Board_Meetings 0.227967 0.109102 2.0895 0.03713 ** 
Board_Size -0.109499 0.294201 -0.3722 0.70990  
Insider_Ownersh 0.0835323 0.0721047 1.1585 0.24718  
Age 0.00839255 0.168901 0.0497 0.96039  
Independent Director -4.9246 4.45604 -1.1052 0.26959  
Gender -0.0515969 5.87387 -0.0088 0.99299  
Firm_Size 13.4719 1.69212 7.9616 <0.00001 *** 
Leverage -21.1943 3.97061 -5.3378 <0.00001 *** 
R-squared 0.564406 Adjusted R-squared 0.448194 
*** Significant with 99% confidence level 
**  Significant with 95% confidence level 
*   Significant with 90% confidence level 
 
Inconsistent with our expectations and hypothesis, the number of board meetings is 
positively related with firm performance. It can be observed that this variable is 
significantly different from zero with 95 % confidence level. Thus, an increase in board 
activity by 1 meeting leads to an increase of ROA ratio by approximately 0.228. 
According to this result, higher frequency of board meetings improves firm performance 
measured by ROA. 
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Notably, all other corporate governance indicators are no longer significant. Only firm 
size and leverage appear to be significant with 99 % confidence level. Firm size is 
positively related with firm performance; the larger the size of the firm, the higher is its 
performance. Nevertheless, this is not true for the level of debt. The higher the value of 
debt, the lower is the firm performance.  
Introducing this model with ROA as an accounting performance measure, we find out 
that only board activity is significant. Importantly, this governance variable appeared to 
be insignificant in previous chapter, when price to book value was taken as a dependent 
variable. 
In order to examine the link between ROA and the governance variables we provide 
Figure 7 as below. It shows multiple scatterplots of the variables (except age and insider 
ownership that exhibit very small changes over the 5 years period) included in the above 
model.  
 
Figure 7: Multiple graphs ROA with board meetings and size, independence and gender 
 
Source:Gretl 
 65 
ROA appears to increase slightly as board activity, measured by the number of meetings, 
increases. Additionally, the highest value of ROA corresponds to smaller boards but in 
consistency with the regression results, there are not significant changes in ROA due to 
board size changes. The same can be concluded about the last two graphs of the multiple 
scatterplots. ROA does not exhibit considerable changes in relation to board 
independence and gender. The values of ROA remain almost constant to changes of these 
variables. 
 
7.3 Estimation of regression using the mean of variables 
 
An alternative method for investigating the relationship between firm performance and 
governance structure is the estimation of a regression using the mean of variables over 
the period 2005-2009 for each firm. In this case, the data is given a cross sectional 
interpretation. The regression results are shown below: 
 
 
Model 12: OLS, using observations 1-136 
Dependent variable: Price_to_book_v 
 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
const 13.6701 6.82561 2.0028 0.04733 ** 
Board_Meetings -0.000741137 0.149597 -0.0050 0.99605  
Board_Size -0.381217 0.167736 -2.2727 0.02472 ** 
Insider_Ownersh 0.037064 0.0254159 1.4583 0.14723  
Age -0.24976 0.106106 -2.3539 0.02011 ** 
Independent Direct 6.94216 3.82627 1.8143 0.07199 * 
Gender 3.5243 4.16323 0.8465 0.39885  
Leverage 5.53054 1.74403 3.1711 0.00190 *** 
Firm_Size 0.0787768 0.336645 0.2340 0.81536  
R-squared     0.190058 Adjusted R-squared 0.139039 
*** Significant with 99% confidence level 
**  Significant with 95% confidence level 
*   Significant with 90% confidence level 
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Consistent with previous findings, OLS regression output shows a negative and 
significant relationship between price to book value and board size. This result is in line 
with Model 1 (Pooled OLS) in Chapter 6, with a slight difference in significance. In the 
present model, board size is significant with 95 % confidence level. In addition, age 
appears to be negatively related with firm performance with 95 % confidence level, 
reflecting consistency with Model 1. The same can be concluded about the variable of 
leverage, which appears to be significant with 99 % confidence level.  On the other hand, 
the number of independent directors appears to be significant in the model that uses the 
mean of variables, unlikely to Model 1.  
The estimation of the OLS regression using mean of variables, results in a higher power 
of explanation of the relationship between the variables. R – Squared in the present 
model is 19 % compared to the one of Model 1 being 11 %.  
Is the estimation using means of variables a reliable and consistent one? The answer to 
this question depends on the variability of data. In case the variables are fluctuating 
sharply from one year to another, than taking the mean would give us a value that does 
not truly represent the variable. For example, in the present study, price to book value 
exhibits a high variation from 2005 to 2009. This implies that the firms might have a 
higher ratio in 2005 and 2006 but a lower or even a negative in 2007 and 2008. The 
decrease in the value of price to book ratio can be attributed to the financial shocks that 
hit all major U.S firms. And taking the mean of a very low value and a high one leads to 
an average that might categorize the firm as good performing one even if it is not. As a 
consequence, we loose information and the results are no longer reliable.  
In other cases, when variables do not show significant changes from one year to another, 
the method of estimation using the means of variables can generate reliable and effective 
results.  
 
7.4 Past firm performance and current board composition 
 
In the previous chapter we found out that, corporate governance characteristics 
represented by board size, number of independent directors, insider ownership, gender 
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diversity etc, influence firm performance. More specifically, the results indicated that 
greater insider ownership, fewer independent directors in the board and smaller board 
size lead to better performance. But what can be said if we examine this relationship the 
other way around? Does the firm adjust the board composition according to its 
performance? According to (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1988), firms respond to past poor 
performance by adding independent directors in the board. In this section, we will regress 
the number of independent directors on return to assets, insider ownership, board and 
firm size. We will consider as poor performance the one that is associated with lower 
profitability for the firm. As a result, we will take as an explanatory variable the return to 
assets and will show whether the low profits in prior year affect board composition in the 
current year. In the new model, we will take the lagged values for the return to assets and 
other explanatory variables as given in the current year. 
 
Estimating by Pooled OLS method and using 544 observations (as time series length is 
reduced from 5 to 4), we obtain the following regression results: 
 
Model 13: Pooled OLS, using 544 observations 
Included 136 cross-sectional units 
Time-series length = 4 
Dependent variable: Independent Directors 
 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
const 0.550931 0.0714222 7.7137 <0.00001 *** 
ROA_1 -0.000884451 0.000462121 -1.9139 0.05616 * 
Board_Size 3.11244e-05 0.00206825 0.0150 0.98800  
Insider_Ownersh -0.00243889 0.000281343 -8.6687 <0.00001 *** 
Firm_Size 0.0135804 0.00332856 4.0800 0.00005 *** 
R-squared  0.151891 Adjusted R-squared 0.145597 
*** Significant with 99% confidence level 
**  Significant with 95% confidence level 
*   Significant with 90% confidence level 
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The regression estimates for the above model show an inverse relationship between the 
proportion of independent directors and return on assets in prior year. The coefficient of 
lagged return to assets variable is significant with 90 % confidence level. Consistent with 
the study of Hermalin and Weisbach, it can be observed that the firms appoint more 
independent directors in the board as a reaction to past poor performance. A decrease in 
return to assets by 1 % leads to an increase of 0.088 % in the proportion of independent 
directors. Nevertheless, the model indicates that the board size remains the same as this 
variable appears insignificant. This implies that as new directors are added, others are 
removed from the board causing no changes in the board size.  
In the same line with (Bhagat and Black, 2001), higher insider ownership is associated 
with a lower proportion of independent directors. This indicates that firms with a higher 
proportion of stocks held by directors and executives as a group have less independent 
directors in their boards. The insider ownership variable is significant with 99 % 
confidence level. In addition, firm size is positively and significantly related to proportion 
of independent directors. This suggests that larger firms have a higher number of 
independent directors than small firms. 
R squared is relatively small and it explains about 15 % of the variation in board 
independence. 
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Chapter 8  
 
Conclusions 
 
The relationship between board of director’s characteristics and firm performance has 
been a central issue of various empirical studies. The last financial turmoil brought again 
into the focus of attention the important role of corporate boards on helping firms to 
survive in periods of crisis. In this context, we conduct the present study in order to find 
an optimal and accurate model of good corporate governance capturing all characteristics 
that influence board effectiveness and its performance.  
Using price to book value as a proxy of firm performance and board size, independence, 
insider ownership, gender diversity and average age of directors as governance variables 
we find some plausible results. In a sample of 133 large S&P firms over the period 2005 
to 2009, we use fixed effects as an estimation method. The results show that firm 
performance, measured by price to book value, is negatively related to board size, 
independence and average age of board members but positively associated with the 
proportion of stocks held by directors and executives as a group. However, gender 
diversity, proxied by proportion of women on board and board activity measured by 
number of board meetings appear to be insignificant. A strong interaction between firm 
performance and gender diversity appears when gender is introduced in the model as a 
dummy variable. This result implies that the presence of women in the board is important 
rather than their number and appointing another female director in the board has no 
subsequent influence on firm value.  
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Our study increases the understanding of the effect of board structure on firm 
performance by introducing ROA as an accounting-based performance measure, beside 
price to book value that represents a market-based performance measure. We find a less 
significant relationship when the firm performance is measured by return on assets. More 
precisely, board activity appears to be the only significant variable of the model. Other 
alternative models that link governance indicators with firm performance suggest very 
important results. We find evidence that prior firm performance affects current board 
composition. In the same line with (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1988), we show that firms 
appoint more independent directors in the board as a reaction to past poor performance. 
In the present paper, we also introduce new models that explore the relationship of audit 
committee characteristics and the amount of tax fees. The main results suggest that 
members of audit committee that are financially literate influence positively the tax fees 
paid. The high expertise in accounting of the members of audit committee leads to more 
accurate and clarified financial disclosure of the financial statements. 
Besides the remarkable results of the present study, there are some limitations that have 
to be considered. When evaluating the influence of board structure on firm performance, 
it should be taken into account that board characteristics and firm performance can be 
endogenously determined. This implies that firms may choose their board structure in 
response to the situations they face, which are not observed in the study. Furthermore, the 
current firm performance can be the product of the actions taken by prior directors that 
might have left the firm, as well as the present performance can influence the way the 
board will be composed. Another limitation that should be addressed is the sensitivity of 
corporate governance models to various empirical models. The present study shows that 
the results differ significantly across different estimation methods. 
Overall, the study provides strong results on the importance of governance indicators on 
firm performance and gives insights on how firms can improve their board effectiveness 
and performance. 
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APPENDIX A 
Table 1 
 
 
Correlation coefficients of board characteristics 
(obs=680) 
 
Price to 
book value 
Board 
meetings 
Board 
size 
Insider 
ownership 
Age 
Independent 
directors 
Gender Firm size Leverage 
Pricetobookvalue 1.0000         
Boardmeetings -0.0009 1.0000        
Boardsize -0.0938 -0.0244 1.0000       
Insiderownership 0.0869 -0.1352 0.0292 1.0000      
Age -0.1768 0.0884 0.0788 -0.3170 1.0000     
Indepen.directors 0.0278 0.0694 0.0651 -0.3430 0.1940 1.0000    
Gender 0.1350 0.0942 0.1846 0.1500 -0.1935 0.0316 1.0000   
Firmsize 0.0641 -0.1580 0.0472 0.0942 -0.0918 -0.0345 0.1015 1.0000  
Leverage 0.2201 0.0679 0.1256 -0.1119 0.0900 0.1631 0.1958 0.1276 1.0000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 76 
Table 2  
Correlation coefficients of audit committee characteristics 
 
 
 
 l_Tax_Fees 
Board 
meetings 
Board 
size 
Audit 
Committee 
meetings 
Financial 
experts 
        Audit 
Comm.size         
Insider 
Ownership 
l_Firm_Size Leverage 
l_Tax_Fees 1.0000         
Board meetings 0.1532 1.0000        
Board size 0.2427 -0.0244 1.0000       
Audit_Committee -0.0372 0.2368 -0.0569 1.0000      
Financial_expert 0.1275 -0.0080 0.1029 0.0772 1.0000     
Audit Comm.size 0.1781 0.0304 0.4086 -0.0740 0.1829 1.0000    
Insider Ownership   -0.0676 -0.1352 0.0292 -0.0515 -0.0884 -0.1523 1.0000   
l_Firm_Size 0.3267 -0.0000 0.3816 -0.0367 0.0815 0.2609 0.0156 1.0000  
Leverage   0.1763 0.0679 0.1256 -0.0562 0.1141   0.1569   -0.1119 0.3184 1.0000 
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APPENDIX B 
Table 1 
 2005 2006 2007 
Variable Obs Mean  Std. Dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Board Meetings 136 7.26 2.71 3.00 16.00 136 7.64 3.25 4.00 25.00 136 8.15 3.44 4.00 28.00 
Board Size 136 10.43 2.01 5.00 18.00 136 10.51 2.03 6.00 18.00 136 10.73 2.09 6.00 18.00 
Insiders 136 1.89 1.25 0.00 8.00 136 1.79 1.11 0.00 7.00 136 1.81 1.09 0.00 7.00 
Independent 
directors 136 8.54 2.06 4.00 14.00 136 8.72 1.97 4.00 15.00 136 8.92 2.01 4.00 15.00 
Insider 
ownership 136 8.29 14.56 0.34 82.30 136 7.91 14.26 0.21 83.10 136 7.64 14.10 0.01 85.40 
Woman 136 1.46 0.91 0.00 5.00 136 1.51 0.93 0.00 5.00 136 1.64 1.04 0.00 5.00 
Age 136 59.86 3.45 48.72 67.54 136 60.00 3.28 49.50 68.54 136 60.25 3.40 50.40 69.42 
Audit 
commit.meetings 136 9.01 3.23 3.00 19.00 136 9.47 4.12 3.00 38.00 136 8.97 2.81 3.00 15.00 
Financial  experts 136 2.09 1.27 1.00 6.00 136 2.18 1.25 1.00 6.00 136 2.32 1.32 1.00 7.00 
Audit committee 
size 136 4.18 1.18 1.00 8.00 136 4.17 1.15 2.00 9.00 136 4.24 1.12 2.00 7.00 
Tax fees 136 1,372,390 2,805,827 0 16,800,000 136 1,292,360 2,482,662 0 18,500,000 136 1,248,081 2,582,144 0 21,600,000 
Price to book v. 136 5.00 7.14 0.00 79.44 136 4.68 3.94 1.03 37.71 136 4.84 5.21 -3.92 44.60 
ROA 136 9.26 7.27 -7.28 61.07 136 9.36 6.73 
-
18.31 46.84 136 8.33 9.08 
-
68.62 22.57 
Leverage 136 0.53 0.18 0.08 0.96 136 0.53 0.19 0.08 0.97 136 0.55 0.18 0.10 1.01 
Firm size 136 1.26 0.91 0.23 4.74 136 1.27 0.91 0.26 5.03 136 1.26 0.91 0.21 5.23 
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  2008 2009  5 Years    
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Board Meetings 136 7.64 2.51 4.00 16.00 136 7.64 3.10 4.00 22.00 680 7.66 3.02 3.00 28.00 
Board Size 136 10.71 1.94 6.00 17.00 136 10.56 1.94 6.00 16.00 680 10.59 2.00 5.00 18.00 
Insiders 136 1.68 1.11 0.00 7.00 136 1.60 1.06 0.00 6.00 680 1.75 1.13 0.00 8.00 
Independent 
directors 136 9.03 1.96 4.00 13.00 136 8.96 1.95 4.00 14.00 680 8.83 2.00 4.00 15.00 
Insider 
ownership 136 7.43 14.00 0.00 83.70 136 6.72 12.23 0.04 70.86 680 7.60 13.82 0.00 85.40 
Woman 136 1.61 1.06 0.00 5.00 136 1.65 1.06 0.00 6.00 680 1.57 1.00 0.00 6.00 
Age 136 60.65 3.19 51.40 69.00 136 61.01 3.42 51.67 69.72 680 60.35 3.37 48.72 69.72 
Audit 
commit.meetings 136 9.13 2.55 3.00 15.00 136 8.93 2.53 3.00 15.00 680 9.10 3.10 3.00 38.00 
Financial  experts 136 2.41 1.34 1.00 6.00 136 2.49 1.31 1.00 6.00 680 2.30 1.30 1.00 7.00 
Audit committee 
size 136 4.24 1.13 3.00 7.00 136 4.21 1.09 1.00 7.00 680 4.21 1.13 1.00 9.00 
Tax fees 136 1,085,544 1,747,751 0 9,796,000 136 1,084,204 1,953,411 0 15,000,000 680 1,216,516 2,344,251 0 21,600,000 
Price to book 
value 136 3.50 4.02 0.59 37.82 136 3.38 2.97 
-
17.27 13.16 680 4.28 4.91 
-
17.27 79.44 
ROA 136 6.88 9.62 
-
38.07 31.12 136 6.79 7.01 
-
17.02 35.08 680 8.12 8.08 
-
68.62 61.07 
Leverage 136 0.57 0.20 0.11 0.98 136 0.55 0.19 0.11 1.08 680 0.54 0.19 0.08 1.08 
Firm size 136 1.28 0.96 0.28 5.72 136 1.16 0.91 0.17 5.56 680 1.25 0.92 0.17 5.72 
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                APPENDIX C 
 
                Table 1       Variance of Inflation Factor 
 
 
  Variance Inflation Factor 
Board_Meetings 1.064 
Board_Size 1.08 
Insider_Ownersh 1.275 
Age 1.192 
Independent_Dir 1.18 
Gender 1.172 
Firm_Size 1.062 
Leverage 1.134 
 
